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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores U.S.-Albanian relations, focusing on the security cooperation 
between both nations in the war on terrorism. Since its inception as an independent state, 
regardless of the ideological fashions, modern Albania’s relations with the United States 
of America have remained a constant in the shifting pattern of Albanian politics. These 
relations have been complex in their development and their complexity can only be 
understood in the historical context of the international situation in general and that of 
Albania in particular. Their most important feature is that after the First World War, 
Albania survived as an independent state largely due to the support given to her by the 
United States. Certainly Albanian-U.S. relations have had their ups and downs, with the 
most unfortunate period being the post-World War Two period, where both governments 
failed to arrive at satisfactory arrangements for the establishment of diplomatic relations 
and hence put Albania under communist domination for half a century. After the collapse 
of communism, a revitalization of U.S.-Albanian relations took place. In the last twelve 
years, every Albanian government’s decision to prioritize the strengthening of Albania’s 
security relations with the United States has been unequivocal and fundamentally sound. 
In fact Albania is becoming an increasingly important ally for the United States in the 
Balkans. Although Albania is a small and rather poor country by U.S. standards, the 
security partnership between the two countries reached a zenith during the crisis of 
Kosovo. Kosovo’s crisis underscored Albania’s utility as a staging area for NATO’s 
operations in the Balkans. Albania allowed the United States/NATO to use its territory 
and air space for the Kosovo operation and also during crises in Bosnia, an allowance that 
even some NATO allies couldn’t make.  After September 11, the Bush administration has 
made clear that it puts greater emphasis upon coalitions than upon alliances. The close 
relation between United States and Albania was further fostered after the September 11 
terrorist attack in New York and Washington, D.C., as Albania unequivocally offered to 
cooperate with the United States on the war on terrorism. At a time when the United 
States is increasingly focused on security outside of Europe, Albania is trying to 
successfully engage itself on the war against terrorism by freezing terrorist assets, 
 vi
shutting down suspect Islamic NGOs, expelling Islamic extremists, and providing 
military and diplomatic support for the U.S.-led actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. This has 
not only led to unparalleled bilateral cooperation in terms of defense, through which 
Albania is undertaking the most far- reaching reform in the history of its armed forces, 
but also to the prospects for Albania of economic and diplomatic payoffs that were 
previously beyond Albania’s reach. U.S.-Albanian relations have had their ups and down, 
but widespread positive sentiment toward the United States has been constant in Albanian 
public opinion. This paper is far from a full study of Albanian-U.S. relations, even though 
their ups and downs may help determine the complexity and various manifestations of 
affection toward the United States, but what mattes most is that in the new trend of 
cooperation on the global war on terrorism, Albania, as a perceived Muslim majority 
country, may prove in the future to be more important to the United States through her 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
America is almost as dear as their motherland and upon whom no other 
country has such a hold on their imagination and affection.  
C. Telford Erickson, 1922I. 
Recent Gallup polls1 indicate that Albania remains by far the most pro-American 
nation in Europe, with more than ninety-five percent of the population supporting the 
U.S. international security policy. In a time when widespread criticism prevails among 
European public opinion regarding the United States' intervention in Iraq, it is fair for 
skeptics to ask whether this reverse trend of Albanian pro-Americanism is part of the 
shifting pattern of Albanian politics vis-à-vis greater national powers, or simply a brief 
gestation expressed by Albanians in the period of radical transformation from 
communism to the new world of freedom. In fact, a sense of betrayal by greater national 
powers and the complex relations Albania shares with her neighbors have largely 
determined the Albanian quest for a more powerful protector, but the skeptics of pro-
Americanism refer to Albanian politics and overlook the fact that Albanian public 
opinion has remained pro-American even when the United States has been vilified by 
Communist propaganda and when diplomatic relations between the two countries have 
been severed.  
The origins of Albanian affection toward the United States are varied, but one of 
the most significant reasons for such affection remains the contrast between the American 
and European approaches toward Albanian independence. For a long period of time, in 
the Albanian imagination, Europe has reflected Albanian fears of dismemberment, while 
the United States has reflected Albanian hope for independence. Furthermore, in this 
imagination, the suffering that has been caused by Albania’s neighbors has been blamed 
first and foremost on the indifference of Europe toward the Albanian question. 
Even in the period after the Cold War, it is often difficult to differentiate between 
Albanian pro-Americanism as an expression of affection toward the United States, or as a 
                                                 
1 Gallup International website at: http://www.gallup-international.com/ 
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critique of anti-Albanian excesses in Western Europe that are truly worthy of criticism. In 
the last fifteen years, when Balkan history became again a blooded rerun of its past, 
positive feelings toward the United States have risen even higher in Albania, and the 
credibility of the United States in the eyes of Albanians remains particularly sound. 
Albanians have considered the United States as an impartial actor in the complicated 
politics of the Balkans and have fully supported the United States during the conflicts in 
Bosnia and Kosovo. The close relation between the United States and Albania was 
further fostered after the September 11 terrorist attack in New York and Washington, 
D.C., as Albania unequivocally offered to cooperate with the United States on the war on 
terrorism. Albania also supported the U.S. operation in Iraq by sending troops there, a 
decision that put her at odds with some prominent members of the European Union. In 
the last twelve years, politics in Albania have reflected the public affection toward the 
United States by supporting the United States in almost every decision taken with regard 
to regional security affairs. Every Albanian governmental decision to prioritize the 
strengthening of Albania’s security relations with the United States has been unequivocal 
and fundamentally sound. 
A. THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS THE INDEPENDENCE OF ALBANIA 
Since the day modern Albania emerged as an independent state, regardless of the 
ideological fashions, Albania’s relations with the United States of America have 
remained a constant in the shifting pattern of Albanian politics. Whether on good terms 
or bad, these relations have been the focus of Albanian foreign policy. Since the First 
World War these relations have been complex both in nature and in the way they have 
been developed, but the most important feature of these relations is that Albania has 
survived as an independent state largely due to the support given to her by the United 
States. The complexity of U.S.-Albanian relations can only be understood in the 
historical context of the international situation in general and that of Albania in particular. 
The United States of America emerged from the First World War as the leading 
power in international affairs. President Woodrow Wilson entered world politics with a 
new doctrine of American international engagement that opposed traditional American 
isolationism. He recognized that international peace was of paramount American interest, 
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because a major war in any part of the world would endanger American well-being. The 
American President introduced his concept of the modern world in his famous “peace 
without victory” speech2 delivered before Congress on January 22, 1917, in which he 
harshly criticized European imperialism and the balance-of-power politics that, in his 
rationalization, had caused the war. In his speech Wilson laid out a plan of fourteen 
points that he believed would prevent future wars. According to President Wilson’s 
vision of the world, the new order would be based on the right of self-determination 
without great power interference, which would guarantee freedom and equal status for all 
nations. Wilson envisioned a new collective security for the free community of nations by 
creating the League of Nations, abolishing all secret alliances, and setting on the road to 
independence the colonies and the national states that made up the Austro-Hungarian and 
Ottoman empires. President Wilson's plan resulted in a major shift in the international 
political situation that was definitely in favor of Albania’s independence, and, most 
importantly, it was against the constant plans of partition by her neighbors.  
Located in a strategic position in Southeastern Europe, for centuries, Albania has 
had a history of foreign domination and continuous efforts to secure her partition.3 The 
fight for control over the area inhabited by the Albanian people has always been 
motivated by open territorial disputes. The Balkans have been the traditional powder keg 
of European politics and, unfortunately, Albania has not been an exception to this rule. 
On the contrary, Albania has been an apple of discord among her more powerful 
neighbors, more often than commonly realized. 4 The process of the infamous 
“Balkanization," the development of long running national and ethnic disputes, like so 
much else in the modern history of that region, began with the disintegration of the 
Ottoman Empire. In the mid-nineteenth century, the desperate internal crisis of the 
                                                 
2 For more on President Wilson's speech and his vision of the new world order, see Thomas J. Knock. 
To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order. Princeton, N.J: Princeton 
University Press. Reprint edition 1995. 
3 For the history of Albania see: Stefanaq Pollo and Arben Puto. The History of Albania: From Its Origins 
to the Present Day. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981; Joseph Swire, Albania: The Rise of a 
Kingdom. Reprint ed. New York: Arno, 1971. Anton Logoreci. The Albanians: Europe's Forgotten 
Survivors. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977. 
4 Paul Lendvai. Eagles in Cobwebs: Nationalism and Communism in the Balkans. Garden City, New 
York: Doubleday & Company, 1969. 
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Ottoman Empire had an immense effect on all of the nations living under its rule. The 
Balkan nations launched a national revolution and gradually they started to catch up with 
the European states. Like other nationalities of the region, Albanians understood the 
weakness of the crumbling Ottoman Empire, and in the late nineteenth century resorted to 
arms,5 but due to complex domestic and international factors they were unable to catch 
up with the neighboring nation-states.6  
Although a Constituent Assembly meeting in the south port of Vlora on 
November 28, 1912, declared Albania an independent state and set up a provisional 
government, the fate of Albania was decided in an ambassadorial conference held in 
London in December of that year, after the First Balkan War. Surrounded by tensions and 
pressures from all Balkan neighboring countries that wanted to take as much as possible 
from the weak Albania, the Conference of Ambassadors concluded with the Treaty of 
London in May 1913. Presided over by Britain's foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, the 
Treaty left out of Albania large parts of her territory. Kosovo and western Macedonia 
were given to Serbia7 and a part of southern Albania was given to Greece. As Grey 
admitted in a speech to the British Parliament, the essential goal for the Conference's 
decisions was preserving the agreement among the Great Powers themselves.8 In spite of 
the fact that the conference of the Great Powers’ ambassadors proclaimed the existence 
of a free and independent Albania as a basic condition for the maintenance of peace in the 
Balkan Peninsula9, large parts of what was left of Albania were still occupied by her 
                                                 
5 On the Albanian revolt see Stavro Skendi. The Albanian National Awakening, 1878-1912, Princeton 
N.J: Princeton University Press, 1967. 
6 All the countries of the Balkans were under Ottoman rule for almost five centuries. Greece declared 
its independence in 1829; Serbia in 1878; Montenegro in 1878; Bulgaria in 1908; Romania in 1878; 
Albania in 1912. 
7 One of Serbia's primary aims during the Balkan wars was to gain an Adriatic port, preferably Durrës. 
Austria-Hungary and Italy opposed giving Serbia an outlet to the Adriatic, which they feared would 
become a Russian port. They instead supported the creation of an autonomous Albania. Russia backed 
Serbia's and Montenegro's claims to Albanian-inhabited lands. Britain and Germany remained neutral. 
8  Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons (1908-1928) 51:817. Quoted by T. Zavalani in 
Nationalism in Eastern Europe. Edited by Peter F. Sugar and Ivo John Lederer. Seattle: University of 
Washington Press. 1994, p. 73. 
9 Gianni Amadeo. L’Albania dall’ independenza all unione con l’Italia. Milano 1940, p. 147. 
 5
more powerful neighbors, and the final and exact boundary lines were still not defined.10 
Therefore, the birth of a modern state of Albania was delayed for almost fifteen years.11 
The outbreak of the First World War found the new Albanian state without any 
agreed-upon frontiers and occupied first by its neighbors and later by Austria in the north, 
France in the southeast, and Italy in the south.12 The rival claims of Italy, Greece, and 
Yugoslavia dominated the endless disputes about Albania’s future at the Versailles Peace 
Conference.13 The situation was biased in favor of Italy, which in the secret Treaty of 
London in 191514 had secured the promise of a mandate over central Albania, including 
the annexation of the two strategically situated Adriatic ports of Vlora (Valona) and 
Sazani (Sasseno). Italy was even promised by the Triple Entente powers that she would 
be rewarded the protectorate over Albania in exchange for entering the war against 
Austria-Hungary. Under the secret treaty, Serbia and Montenegro, too, were promised 
much  of  northern  Albania.  The  Greeks,  on  the  other  hand, concluded a deal with the  
                                                 
10 The Conference of London, by the Treaty of May 30, 1913, left the boundaries of Albania for 
settlement by the European powers. These were actually described by decisions of the Conference of 
Ambassadors in London on May 22 and August 11, 1913. The delimitation of the southern Albanian 
boundary was completed on the scene in December 1913. 
11 Following the London Treaty, the Great Powers further decided on recognizing an independent state 
of Albania ruled by a constitutional monarchy and under the protection of the Great Powers. After myriad 
negotiations, the Great Powers agreed to appoint Prince Wilhelm of Wied, a thirty-five-year-old German 
army captain, to head the new state. Prince Wied arrived in Albania in March 1914 but he was faced with 
local power struggles, miserable economic conditions, and foreign provocations. As result, a general 
insurrection mounted in the summer of 1914 forced the Prince to leave the country only six months after 
his arrival. See Puto and Pollo. History of Albania 
12 Between 1913-1916 armies of Italy, Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, France, and Austria 
were deployed in Albanian territory. For more on the situation in Albania during this period see: Ivan T. 
Berend. Decades of Crisis: Central and Eastern Europe Before World War II. Barkley and Los Angeles, 
CA: University of California Press, 1998. 
13 The Conference was held between January and July 1919. For more on Versailles Treaty see: 
Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference 1919. Vol. I,II,III,IV,V; United States 
Government Printing Office, 1942-1946; Margaret Macmillan. Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the 
World. London, U.K: Random House, 2003.  
14 Held in April 1915. 
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Italians for dividing Albania between Greece and Italy, claiming the need to protect the 
Orthodox Albanians “many of whom did not speak the Greek language, they only spoke 
Albanian.”15  
In January 1920, at the Paris Peace Conference, negotiators from France, Britain, 
and Greece, in the absence of a U.S. negotiator, agreed to divide Albania among 
Yugoslavia, Italy, and Greece as a diplomatic maneuver aimed at finding a compromise 
solution to the territorial conflict between Italy and Yugoslavia. That was contrary to the 
determination of President Wilson expressed on May 6, 1919, in a meeting with British 
Prime Minister Lloyd George and France’s Clemenceau: “Albania ought to be 
independent.”16 Albania’s fate seemed to have been sealed, as the Great Powers were 
more than willing to close a tough chapter of complex disputes and satisfy all the 
pretenders. Albanians strongly rejected the secret partition plans and cautioned the Great 
Powers against the dismemberment of the country, warning that if the dismemberment 
were to be confirmed, “the only hope of peace [for Albanians] would be emigration or 
death”.17   
An Albanian National Assembly, known as the Congress of Lushnja, held in 
January 1920, called for the unity of all Albanians regardless of religion or ideological 
affiliation. Recognizing the seriousness of the situation, the Congress appointed a four-
man Regency Council. Each member represented one of the four major religions of the 
country, Muslim, Orthodox, Roman Catholics, and Bektashi. A bicameral parliament was 
also created, appointing members of its own ranks to an upper chamber, the Senate. An 
elected lower chamber, the Chamber of Deputies, had one deputy for every 12,000 people 
in Albania and, not unexpectedly, one deputy for the large Albanian-American 
                                                 
15 The quote is from Greek Prime Minister Venizelos” address at the Paris Peace Conference on Greek 
territory claims. For more on Venizelos address see: 15 Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris 
Peace Conference 1919. Vol.III; United States Government Printing Office, 1943. p .857-865. 
16 Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference 1919. Vol.V; United States 
Government Printing Office, 1946. p. 483. 
17 Secretary’s Notes of Conversation Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on 
Monday, 24th February, 1919, at 3 p.m. Addendum. Albanian Claims: Statement by Touran Pasha.  Foreign 
Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference 1919. Vol.IV; United States Government 
Printing Office, 1943. p.111-116. 
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community in the United States. In its inaugural message the Regency Council expressed  
“heartfelt thanks to President Wilson for his defense of the rights of Albanians. They 
remain convinced that the great American Republic will continue to support their rightful 
national claims.”18  
The rising resistance of the Albanians in the country itself and the deteriorated 
situation among the neighbors reinforced President Woodrow Wilson’s determination to 
resist the dismemberment of the country and to recognize the independence of Albania.19 
In March 1920, President Woodrow Wilson intervened to block the Paris agreement by 
noting “with satisfaction that the British and French governments have not lost sight of 
the interests and future well-being of the Albanian people. The American government can 
well understand that the division of Albania into three parts, as stipulated in Anglo-
French agreement, would be acceptable to the Yugoslav government, but it is as strongly 
opposed to anything that would harm the Albanians in order to please Yugoslavs, as it is 
opposed to injuring Yugoslavs to the advantage of the Italians.”20The United States 
underscored its support for Albania’s independence and in December 1920 the League of 
Nations recognized Albania’s sovereignty by admitting it as a full member. Thereafter, a 
new era started for the relations of Albania with the United States. Preserving the 
independence of Albania has since been the constant U.S. policy, despite ups and downs 
in the relations between the two countries. Within the framework of the independent 
Albania, the task of creating a nation-state proved to be difficult not only due to the 
inherited tribal social structure of the country, but more importantly, because it took a 
further six years until its neighbors were forced to recognize the final and exact boundary 
lines.21  
                                                 
18 T. Zavalani in Nationalism in Eastern Europe. Edited by Peter F. Sugar and Ivo John Lederer. 
Seattle: University of Washington Press. 1994, p. 79. 
19 Paul Lendvai. Eagles in Cobwebs: Nationalism and Communism in the Balkans. Garden City, New 
York: Doubleday & Company, 1969. p. 219. 
20  Justin Godard. L’Albanie en 1921. Paris: Presses Universitaires.1922. p. 205. Quoted in 
Nationalism in Easter Europe. p. 77. 
21 An international frontier-drawing commission headed by an Italian General was mandated by the 
Conference of Ambassadors of the Great Powers. The Italian General was assassinated by Greeks, and as 
retaliation the island of Korfu was bombarded and even occupied by Mussolini’s navy. 
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B. THE NEW STATE OF ALBANIA AND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE 
UNITED STATES 
 
Their vitality and determination to maintain their independence has no 
equal in human history. 
Milovan Djilas 
The new state of Albania immediately sought to establish diplomatic relations 
with the United States. Apart from the utilitarian aspect of the dire need for political and 
economic support, at the time there were also thousands of Albanians who had arrived in 
the United States to whom America was “almost as dear as their motherland and upon 
whom no other country has such a hold on their imagination and affection.” 22  In 
December 1921, an Albanian delegation contacted the U.S. ambassador in Rome and 
requested diplomatic recognition by the United States, and promised that the Albanian 
government would grant concessions to U.S. oil companies.23 In fact, a couple of U.S. oil 
companies had already been seeking oil concessions from Albania, where oil fields with 
large reserves ready to develop were found.24  Secretary of Commerce Hoover, was 
concerned that the U.S. companies were at a disadvantage in securing concessions with 
the Albanian government compared to the position of the Italian and British companies, 
inasmuch as both Britain and Italy had already sent active representatives to Albania to 
advance the claims of their nationals. Therefore, to support the U.S. companies trying to 
do business in Albania, Secretary Hoover suggested to the Secretary of State that serious 
consideration be given to the recognition of Albania and the possibility of sending 
American government representatives to the country.25  
                                                 
22 U.S. Ambasador in Italy in a telegram to the Secretary of State Hughes on April 3, 1922, citing a 
U.S. emissary at the time, C. Telford Erickson, who later represented the Government of Albania in 
contacts with the U.S. officials prior to establishing diplomatic relations. The Ambasador in Italy (Child) to 
the Secretary of State Hughes, Document No. 875.6363/20. December 13, 1921. The Foreign Relations of 
the United States, 1922, Vol.I, p. 594 
23 The Ambasador in Italy (Child) to the Secretary of State. Document No. 875.01/158. December 13, 
1921. Ibid. 
24 Ibid., 595 
25 The Secretary of Commerce (Hoover) to the Secretary of State. Document No.875.6363/21. April 
26, 1922. Ibid.,596. 
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By the end of April 1922, the Department of State sent Mr. Maxwell Blake to 
Albania as consul general to inquire about the situation in the country and advise on any 
possible relations that ought to be established. Blake soon reported that although the 
Albanian State had not definitely emerged from the stages of hopeful experiment, it was, 
nevertheless, sufficiently established in fact to command international support.26 Blake 
brought to the attention of the U.S. government the material factors that were worthy of 
consideration by emphasizing the commercial possibilities that Albania offered through 
possession of rich natural resources awaiting development.27 He also conveyed to the 
State Department the moral encouragement that Albanians needed in their struggle to 
preserve their independence by underlining the high regard of Albanians toward the 
United States  
The Albanian government, on the other side, reiterated its pledge of according 
concessions to American concerns and also promised that the American interests in 
Albania would receive the most-favored-nation treatment even without signing a formal 
economic agreement. The Albanian government accepted without objection the American 
passports carried by naturalized Albanian-Americans and released from military duty all 
holders of U.S. passports28 who were serving in the Albanian Army. 
On July 28, 1922, the United States recognized Albania de jure and, by December 
of that year, the United States sent Mr. U. Grant-Smith to Tirana as U.S. minister to 
Albania, thus starting officially the bilateral relations between the two countries.  This 
coincided with the time when Ahmet Zogu was appointed Prime Minister of Albania. A 
former officer in the Austrian Army, Zogu had held various ministerial posts in the 
Albanian government since 1920; he became the leader of a reformist Popular Party that 
created the republican government in 1922. In the first years of formal relations, the 
representatives from the United States tried to negotiate concessions for two U.S. oil 
                                                 
26 The Commissioner in Albania (Blake) to the Secretary of State.Tirana, June 28, 1922. Document 
No. 875.01/215. Ibid., 602. 
27 Ibid., 603. 
28 Believing in the prosperity of an Albanian independent state, between 1919-1925, twenty to thirty 
thousand Albanian émigrés journeyed back to Albania from the United States. For more on this, see Joan F. 
Kontos. Read Cross, Black Eagle, A Biography of the Albanian-American School, New York, 1981. 
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companies operating in Albania, Sinclair Exploration Company, and Standard Oil 
Company. As already noted, the concessions were already promised by the Albanian 
government, but negotiations were severely handicapped by opposition from various 
foreign interests, particularly from Italian and British oil companies.29 Negotiations were 
also handicapped by the inability of U.S. companies to obtain a financial loan for 
supporting their activity in Albania.  
In the meantime, the economic conditions in Albania worsened, and political 
stability deteriorated. Albanian governments appeared and disappeared in rapid 
succession. Between July and December 1921 for example, Albania’s prime minister was 
changed five times. On 6 April 1924 two American tourists were shot dead as they drove 
on the road toward northern Albania.30 Their murder caused great dismay throughout 
Albania, and deep anxiety for the government. Although it was never fully determined 
who actually carried out the attack, different theories captivated public opinion. Apart 
from the common suggestion that armed bandits murdered the tourists, there also have 
been theories that emphasized political reasons. One theory suggested that they had been 
mistaken for supporters of the opposition, while another, which seemed more plausible, 
suggested that the crime was committed in order to discredit the government in the eyes 
of foreign observers in a time of continuing border disputes with both Greece and 
Yugoslavia.31 Not very long after the death of the Americans, on May 5 Avni Rustemi, a 
prominent politician,32 was assassinated outside the Parliament building in Tirana. The 
opposition accused the government of being unable to ensure the safety of either 
Albanian or foreign citizens and, to the despair of Zogu, the opposition gave the young 
Rustemi a martyr’s funeral in the southern town of Vlora. Following the funeral, a 
popular liberal-minded revolt engulfed the country, led by Zogu’s main political rival, 
                                                 
29 In a report to the Secretary of State dated December, 21, 1923, the U.S. Minister in Albania, Grant-
Smith, noted that the Anglo-Persian agents continued to be active. They had the support of Mr. Justin 
Godard, the French author of a well-known Albanophile work, who was well regarded by Albanians. His 
endeavor aimed at securing an oil concession for an area near Vlora (Valona). For more see: Ibid., p. 608. 
30 Robert Luis Coleman and George B. de Long. 
31 Miranda Vickers. The Albanians: A Modern History. New York: I.B.Tauris & Co. 1995. p. 110. 
32 Leader of a Radical Youth Organization and delegate to the Constituent Assembly. 
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Fan S. Noli, a Harvard graduate of 1912.33 Noli's Liberal opposition forced Zogu into 
exile in June 1924 and formed a quazi-left-oriented government that tried to institute land 
reform. In foreign affairs Noli rushed to recognize Soviet Russia but failed to achieve 
international recognition for his government, despite his eloquent speech at the Assembly 
of the League of Nations in Geneva, a speech that was widely published and made the 
headlines in The New York Times as “one of the most-talked-of, and certainly the most 
picturesque, speeches of the session which made the delegates to the Assembly of the 
League of Nations gasp.”34 Noli appealed to the U.S. government for recognition by 
pledging to fulfill the promises of equal opportunity for U.S. oil companies vis-à-vis 
British and Italian companies. Besides, he promised that his government would bring to 
justice the murderers of the two American tourists. Although the U.S. minister in Tirana 
suggested that Noli’s government was inclined toward the United States and that the 
American interests would be served by the continuance of the new regime, Secretary of 
State Hughes refrained from recognizing a government which had resulted from a 
revolution and had, in fact, overthrown Zogu’s government by force. Moreover, the new 
government was not even considered legal, according to the then-Albanian constitution, 
pending the holding of elections, something that Noli declined  to pursue because he 
believed  the volatile security situation in the country needed a paternalistic government.  
Taking all of this into account, the United States didn’t recognize Noli’s 
government. Secretary Hughes advised his representative in Albania to continue to carry 
on with Noli’s government the relation that the minister had with the previous regime, 
but “[u]nless the Head of the State has been changed, the question of recognition does not 
seem to arise.” 35 Unable to get international recognition and incapable of coping with a 
series of promises for reform, Noli’s position grew weaker every day. However, due to 
international preassure, by November Noli was preparing for election to the Constituent 
                                                 
33 A reform-minded Orthodox bishop, Fan S. Noli was educated with Western ideas at Harvard 
University and had even translated Shakespeare and Ibsen into Albanian. Noli and other Western-oriented 
leaders formed the Opposition Party of Democrats that called for abolishing feudalism, resisting Italian 
domination, and establishing a Western-style constitutional government. 
34 New York Times Oct 5, 1924. p. XX13. 
35 The Secretary of State to the Minister in Albania (Grant-Smith). Document No.875.01/243. June24, 
1924. The Foreign Relations of the United States, 1924, Vol.I.Government Printing Office. 1943. p.311. 
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Assembly. Nevertheless, before the elections could be held, former Prime Minister Zogu, 
who was residing in Yugoslavia, was already going ahead with preparations for a 
comeback. He returned with the assistance of about 1,000 Yugoslav army regulars and 
Tsarist Russian troops settled in Yugoslavia, who volunteered to overthrow Noli in 
retalition for his recognition of the Soviet regime. By Christmas Eve, Zogu executed a 
coup d’etat, ousting Fan Noli and reclaiming the capital. Noli and members of the 
cabinet, accompanied by approximately five hundred fellow idealists, fled into exile.36  
On February 1, 1925, Zogu became the president of a similarly newly proclaimed 
republic. Understanding the importance of the relations with the United States, in early 
1926 Zogu sent to Washington a prominent leader of the Albanian nationalist movement, 
Faik Konica (Konitza) as Albanian minister. Konica thus became the first official 
Albanian representative accredited in the United States.37 Zogu’s main energies were 
devoted to keeping Albania on as friendly relations as possible with her neighbors 
Yugoslavia and Greece.38 He also began to strengthen relations with Italy in exchange for 
loans and, in 1927, signed the controversial Treaty of Tirana, a treaty of friendship with 
Italy that was followed by a military alliance intended to last for 20 years. The Treaty 
was unwelcomed not only by Albania’s neighbors who perceived it as a threat to their 
interests in Albania but also by others in the country who were witnessing the rapid 
economic and military penetration of Mussolini’s Italy. Refering to this treaty, Anne 
O’Hare McCormick in a column in the New York Times of  June 19, 1927, noted that 
“[n]obody is afraid of Italy and everybody is afraid of Mussolini. That, in a sentence, 
sums up the reaction of the Balkans to an Italian diplomatic offensive so irritating that it 
justifies the cynic's observation that the direct cause of every war is a peace treaty.”39 
                                                 
36 In 1930 Noli retired from political life and returned to his academic and religious duties in the U.S. 
37 Albania did not have a legation building in Washington, D.C. therefore Minister Konica maintained 
offices in an apartment of the Mayflower Hotel. 
38 For more on Zogu’s diplomatic efforts, see Bernd Jürgen Fischer.  King Zog and the Struggle for 
Stability in Albania, New York, 1984 
39 Anne O’Hare McCormic: Mussolini Has Hypnotized the Balkans. New York Times June 19, 1927. 
p. SM10. 
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On September 1, 1928, Zogu declared Albania to be a monarchy. Under 
instructions and pressure from Italy,40 he proclaimed himself “Zog First, the King of 
Albanians,” a title that bore an ambiguous connotation for the half of the Albanian 
population that lived outside Albania. Nominally his regime was a constitutional 
monarchy, but for all practical purposes his rule seemed to share many of the 
characteristics of the Italian monarchial government, with a strong police force and a 
complex and inefficient bureaucracy. Because of the title “The King of Albanians” with 
exeptions of Italy, Hungary and Greece, other European states exercised an attitude of 
caution and were just waiting for the position of the United States government. The 
situation for the King become exceedingly oppresive, and silence reigned in political 
circles in Albania for several days until it was broken by the recognition of the monarchy 
by the United States. The foreign minister of Albania, Iliaz Vrioni, considered U.S. 
recognition as “the crowning diplomatic triumph” of the new government which would 
immediately be followed by recognition by all others.41 Actualy, this proved to be the 
case. The U.S. minister in Albania (Hart) conveyed to the State Department the exploding 
joy that erupted in the capital of Albania after the anouncment was made in a very 
inspiring message:  
A demonstration was ordered to be held in front of the Legation on the 
evening of September 15. I invited the multitude to come in the legation 
court. There were about 1,500 persons, headed by the Government’s 
military band. The band first played the American and then the Albanian 
anthem and gave vociferous applause at which juncture nothing was left 
for me to do but make a speech, which I had not intended doing. The 
Department will not receive a copy of the speech, which was entirely 
improptu, but left it suffice to say that I said nothing that would do any 
harm. While it is the usual course for many foreigners, official and 
otherwise, when speaking to the people of this country, to treat the 
Albanians as children, I have never done that. My policy adopted at the 
beginning of my career here was followed once again. I assumed that I 
                                                 
40 U.S. Foreign Relations. 1928. Vol.I. p. 846.  
41 The Minister in Albania (Hart) to the Secretary of State. September 27, 1928. The Foreign Relations 
of the United States, 1928 Vol..Government Printing Office. 1943. 
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was facing an assemblage of several hundred intellectual Babe Ruths42 
and gave everyone of them a base on balls.43  
Zog continued to seek close relations with the United States during his tenure as 
monarch of Albania. Besides establishing his delegation in Washington, Zog managed to 
open an office for an Albanian consular general in New York, which served also as the 
Albanian representative in the World Fair Organization, as well as a consulate in 
Boston.44 In the late 1920s and early 1930s, Albania signed four bilateral treaties with the 
United States45 and eleven multilateral agreements.46 But in the international context 
Zog’s political problems were daunting. Despite his efforts to recover from the disastrous 
treaty with Italy which bore the danger of full colonization, King Zog was unable to 
overcome the tightening screws of fascist Italy over Albania. The Mussolini Memoirs47 
and the Ciano Diaries48 give a full account of just how much the conquest of Albania 
kept dominating Mussolini’s dreams. The United States of America followed the Italian 
penetration into Albania with great concern, and strongly opposed any step against 
Albanian’s independence by fascist Italy. To encourage Albanians in their struggle for 
independence, U.S. Senator Robert R. Reynolds of North Carolina visited Tirana in 
                                                 
42 Babe Ruth, the most famous American baseball player. 
43 Ibid., p.851. 
44 Ironically, even today Zog’s diplomatic establishments remain the biggest Albanian representation 
in the United States. Currently only the Albanian Embassy in Washington, D.C, represents Albania in the 
U.S. The U.S. has already given concurrence to an Albanian request for opening an Albanian general 
consulate, but the decision to send the representatives has not been yet finalized in Albania. 
45 Bilateral treaties between United States and Albania: (1) Arbitration Treaty, signed at Washington, 
October 22, 1928; (2) Conciliation Treaty, signed at Washington, October 22, 1928; (3) Naturalization 
Treaty, signed at Tirana, April 5, 1932; (4) Extradition Treaty, signed at Tirana, March 1, 1933 
46 Multilateral treaties to which both Albania and the United States were parties: (1) Convention for 
the Formation of the International Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs, Regulation and Final 
Declarations, July 5, 1890; (2) International Labor Organization: Convention and Protocol for Limiting the 
Manufacture and Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, July 13, 1931; (3) Treaty for the Limitation and 
Reduction of Naval Armament, London, April 22, 1930; (4) Arrangement relative to the Repression of the 
Circulation of Obscene Publications, May 4, 1910; (5) Conventions and Protocol for the Suppression of the 
Abuse and other Drugs, January 23, 1912 and (6) July 9, 1913; (7) Universal Postal Union of Cairo and 
Final Protocol, March 20, 1934; (8) Treaty for the Renunciation of War (Pact of Paris), August 27, 1928; 
(9) Treaty Recognizing the Sovereignty of Norway over Spitzbergen, February 9, 1920; (10) 
Telecommunication Convention, December 9, 1932; (11) Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition 
of the Wounded of Armies in the Field (International Red Cross Convention), July 6, 1906. 
47 Mussolini’s Memoirs, edited by Raymond Klibansky. Phoenix, AZ: Phoenix Press.2000. 
48 The Ciano Diaries, 1939-1943. Edited by High Gibson. Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday & Co. 1956. 
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December 1937 and met with the King. Senator Reynolds was the highst official from the 
United States who had ever visited the country.  
To ensure the stability and continuity of his reign, on 27 April 1938, Zog married 
Geraldine Apponyi, born in 1915 of an American, Gladys Stewart, and an Austro-
Hungarian Count, Julius Apponyi. But Mussolini’s ambitions over Albania were 
unstoppable, and the occupation of the country seemed to be just a formality. By 1939 
Mussolini was frustrated by the fact that Hitler had accomplished the German annexation 
of Austria and seizure of Czechoslovakia without consultation or compensation for Italy. 
Every time Hitler occupied a country, he just sent a telegram to Mussolini. Therefore, the 
Italian response was the formal occupation of Albania.49 To that goal, by early April 
1939 Italy made a series of demands upon Albania, such as: control of all Albanian ports, 
communications, roads, and the airfields to “safeguard” Albanian independence; an 
Italian organizer in each Albanian ministry who would have the rank of minister, ranking 
immediately below the Albanian minister; Italians in Albania to have equal civil and 
political rights with Albanians; etc. Considering these demands as a move toward a 
protectorate over Albania, King Zog ordered mobilization and refused to consider the 
Italian demands. The Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Galeazo Ciano, who was 
the mastermind of the Albanian occupation, speculated that “King Zog will give in. There 
is above all, a fact on which I am counting: the coming birth of Zog’s child. Zog loves his 
wife very much as well as his whole family. I believe that he will prefer to insure to his 
dear ones a quiet future. And frankly I cannot imagine [Queen] Geraldine running around 
fighting through the mountains…”50 On the eve of the aggression, on April 6 King Zog 
was reported to have left the country and went into exile while his government eventually 
disintegrated. On April 7, 1939, while the Queen had just given birth to a child, Italy 
attacked Albania and, facing an unorganized and poorly armed resistance, easy 
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conquered the country.51 With such a swift and thorough victory, Italy gained what Hitler 
described as “a stronghold which will inexorably dominate the Balkans.”52 
Italy’s attack on Albania was denounced by Secretary of State Cordell Hull 
through a statement that had “the express approval of President Roosevelt.”53 The Italian 
attack was considered as a forcible and violent invasion that constituted unquestionably 
an additional threat to the peace of the world54 The statement of Secretary Hull was 
followed by a formal protest by Faik Konica, the Albanian minister to the United 
States.55  
After the occupation, Italy established a puppet fascist government in the country. 
Under Italian orchestration, the Albanian monarchy was abolished and a delegation from 
the Albanian fascist government offered the crown to the Italian King, Victor Emmanuel, 
thus realizing the union of Italy and Albania on April 16, 1939. Under the new 
arrangement, the Kingdom of Italy and Albania, the Albanian army was incorporated in 
the Italian army, and the Albanian interests abroad had to be protected by Italy. A 
unification of the diplomatic and consular services was followed by the abolishment of 
the ministry of foreign affairs of Albania. The Albanian representation abroad and 
foreign representations in Albania were cancelled. Consequently, on June 12, 1939, the 
United States announced the clousure of the legation in Albania. Opposing the 
occupation and unification of Albania with Italy, the Albanian minister in Washington 
requested that the U.S. government allow the Albanian legation to continue the work as 
the representative of Albania as a means to morally influence public opinion and the 
Albanian community in the United States56 This proposal was not accepted by the U.S. 
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government and in July 1939, the Albanian legation in Washington, D.C., the Albanian 
consular general in New York, and the consulate in Boston were closed. The U.S. 
government never formally terminated its relations with King Zog, but neither did the 
United States recognize the Albanian government in exile. As result there was no 
Albanian authority to represent the country abroad. Even Zog himself was not recognized 
in his capacity as King of Albania; instead he received admittance to England in the 
quality of a distinguished private person and was encouraged throughout his stay in 
London to keep a low profile. The British were sensitive to America’s distrust of British 
support for certain monarchies; the support the British gave to the King of Greece was 
highly criticized by the United States57 This policy of non recognizing an Albanian 
government in exile had a toll for Albanians because unlike other East European 
countries, they were deprived of mustering sufficient strength for representing either 
resistance forces within the country or unified Albanian groups abroad. 
After an easy occupation of Albania, Mussolini decided to use Albania as a 
springboard to invade Greece under the pretext of “protecting the maltreated Albanian 
minority.”58 The Italians launched their attack on October 28, 1940, and at a meeting of 
the two fascist dictators in Florence, Mussolini stunned Hitler with his announcement of 
the Italian invasion. Mussolini counted on a quick victory, but Greek resistance fighters 
halted the Italian army in its tracks and soon forced them into retreat, pushing them back 
into southern Albania. 59 In April 1941, Germany and its allies crushed both Greece and 
Yugoslavia, and a month later the Axis gave Albania control of Kosovo and parts of 
Northern Greece populated by Albanians, thus almost doubling the territory and the 
population of Albania. Ironically, Albanians witnessed the realization of their dreams of 
uniting most of the Albanian-populated lands only during the Axis occupation of their 
country.  
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1. United States-Albanian Relations During World War II 
Eventual Albanians started their armed opposition against the Italian occupation, 
which by late 1941 turned into an organized guerrilla uprising. Recognizing the growing 
anti-Axis resistance in Albania, on December 10, 1942, Secretary of State Hull 
reaffirmed United States support for the restoration of a free Albania.60 Under the title 
“Hull says Albania will be kept free,” The New York Times noted that “the Albanian 
people were encouraged to overthrow Italian rule by Secretary of State Cordell Hull 
tonight in a statement that forecast American military assistance to the guerrilla bands 
that are operating against the Italian forces in that country”. 61  The secretary’s 
announcement was followed by the same statement given by the ministers of foreign 
affairs of Great Britain62and the Soviet Union.63 Be that as it may, at the very moment 
that Allied countries were engaged in fearful fighting with Axis powers, a bizarre 
movement was initiated by the Greek government. The prime minister of Greece, in a 
memorandum sent to the secretary of state, expressed the Greek frustration toward the 
secretary’s statement in support of restoration of a free Albania that was “unacceptable to 
Greek nation without a clear simultaneous recognition of their rights in the district of 
Northern Epirus [southern Albania].” 64  In addition to that, the Greek government, 
through its ambassador in Washington, requested to negotiate secret talks with the U.S. 
government over Greek claims in Southern Albania. After expressing surprise at such a 
request, Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles pointed out “the U.S. government had 
not and would not make any secret commitments with regard to territorial changes to any 
other country”.65 As far as Greek territorial claims, the American position was along the 
lines of the general government policy maintained most strictly by Secretary of State 
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Cordell Hull: since there were many territorial disputes throughout Europe, the best 
approach would be to try to have them postponed until after the war.  
Besides the Italian occupation of the country, the most important question for 
Albanians remained the Greek claims over southern Albania. When Athens signaled its 
intention to annex Northern Epirus (southern Albania), the Albanians changed their initial 
attitude of applauding the victories of the Greeks in their war against the Axis.66  
As the Albanian resistance was growing, the lack of unity among the various 
groups of patriots in the country became evident. Two major competitive resistance 
groups emerged, Nationalists under the name Balli Kombetar (National Front) and 
Communists under the name FNC (National Liberation Movement). After some early 
cooperation between them, striking differences regarding the way of proceeding with the 
war against Italians and Germans, and particularly the way the annexed territories would 
be handled in a post-war Albania, turned the Albanian resistance into a bloody civil war. 
Nationalists were committed to retaining the territorial annexations of 1941. Some of 
them, impressed by German “willingness” to recognize Albania’s “neutrality” and 
reconstitute the Albanian Council of Regents, even supported the Germans. Communists, 
on the other hand, inspired and backed by Tito’s partisans, claimed anti-Axis purity, 
including the repudiation of Axis-initiating territorial transfers. 67 
Throughout the war the United States encouraged Albanian leaders to prevent 
hostilities among them and to avoid internal warfare, considering that the Albanian cause 
would be helped in the eyes of the Allies by a unification of all resistance groups for 
common actions against the Germans and for the liberation of their country.68 Due to the 
unwillingness of President Roosevelt to engage the U.S. military in southern Europe and 
the Balkans, the overall U.S. engagement in Albania, as in other parts of the region, was 
limited. In American-British strategic affairs, Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed in 
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March 1942 that the Pacific was to be an American region, the Middle East would belong 
to Britain, while Europe and the Atlantic were to fall under joint responsibility. 
According to this plan, which was basically followed throughout the war, the Balkans 
also belonged to the British Middle East Theater.69  
Following this Allied strategy, and to organize the anti-Axis resistance in the 
Balkans, the British established their missions in the countries of the region. By late 
spring 1943 the British had already established their mission in Albania and had stationed 
liaison officers in both resistance movements. Between the spring of 1943 and the end of 
1944, around fifty British officers were sent to Albania to coordinate the Allied assistance 
and motivate the anti-Axis resistance. American policy at that time was based on the 
“primacy of military considerations” that meant supplying with weapons groups that 
were actively engaged in fighting the Germans. On the reports of the British mission, the 
Allied Command denounced the Nationalists as collaborators and supported the 
communists throughout the war by supplying them with scores of weapons, thus helping 
them to become the leading force in the Albanian war.70 The United States hoped that 
after the war Albanians would leave aside their disputes and would succeed in forming a 
broadly representative provisional government conforming to the will of the Albanian 
people that could restore order in the country.71  
The Communists were able to manipulate the Nationalists’ activities into 
collaboration with the Germans and succeeded in linking the larger war, the war against 
Axis forces, with the civil war against their domestic enemies. The U.S. policy of aiding 
groups who fought Germans was gradually applied to FNC, culminating in an agreement 
signed in Bari in August 1944 for coordinating action against the Germans and delivering 
the military supplies. In addition to that, Secretary of State Hull advised the Allied Force 
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headquarters at Caserta against any supplying of arms for the Nationalists because, apart 
from the question of the charges made against them of collaboration with the Germans, 
they had demonstrated an inactivity vis-à-vis the common enemy, the Germans. 72 
Largely due to appeals made by the Voice of America and BBC, mass support for an 
Albanian uprising emerged particularly in the southern part of the country where the 
communist resistance was stronger. LNC was particularly successful in appealing to the 
younger generation. By the summer of 1943, secondary schools were closed because 
many young Albanians had joined the LNC.73 
The U.S. decision to stop supplying Nationalists with weapons, followed as it was 
by the withdrawal of the British mission from the Nationalists’ headquarters, was in fact 
a costly decision for Albania because, besides the tendencies of the Nationalists to 
collaborate with the Germans and their unwillingness to fight without promises of British 
support, this decision brought about the collapse of all opposition or potential opposition 
to the FNC. 
In mid-1944, British headquarters further encouraged partisan forces on their 
movement and advised Enver Hoxha to gradually build up the National Liberation 
Council and its army. The British also assured him that relations between British 
headquarter and Hoxha would be strengthened for postwar purposes.74 On May 24, the 
Albanian National Liberation forces, in a convention held in the town of Permet, created 
the Anti-Fascist National Liberation Council, a supreme legislative and executive organ, 
and the Anti-Fascist National Liberation Committee, with the attributes of a provisional 
government. Among other decisions, the convention, commonly known as Congress of 
Permet, forbade King Zog re-entry into the country and annulled all international treaties 
signed before the Italian occupation of Albania. Officially, the National Liberation 
Movement was a mass organization representing all shades of “democratic” political 
opinion, but in reality it only implemented the program and the policies of the Albanian 
Communist Party. The LNC Congress requested additional military missions from the 
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United States and the Soviet Union and urged the Allies not to work with what the LNC 
regarded as “discredited political parties.” It also expressed the desire for military 
recognition from the Allies, the exchange of military representatives, and the increasing 
of military support. An agreement was reached and a team of three Albanian military 
representatives was stationed in Bari at the Balkan Air Command, an Allied body that 
was coordinating all activities in the Balkans. Five months later, in October 1944, another 
convention was held in the town of Berat, in which, following Tito’s75 example, the Anti-
Fascist National Liberation Committee was changed to the Democratic Government of 
Albania. Enver Hoxha, the leader of the Communist Party, was named the President of 
the Council of Ministers. On October 20, Hoxha made a declaration to the effect that all 
three Great Allies would be requested to recognize his government. Meanwhile, on 
September 23, 1944, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had sent a directive to the supreme 
Allied commander, Mediterranean Theatre, Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander, 
authorizing him to deal with such local groups as he found in control in Albania, in the 
absence of a recognized government. A joint American-British team, Military Liaison 
Albania, was sent to the country to coordinate civilian relief in liberated Albania.76 
Hoxha also requested that a military representative be sent to Washington to coordinate 
military cooperation between the United States and Albania. He also wanted to send a 
financial representative to coordinate any assistance from the United States, as well as to 
coordinate with Albanians in the United States the resumption of remittances to their 
relatives in Albania that had been broken off during the war. The U.S. government 
considered these requests as premature, since formal relations had not been established.  
2. United States-Albanian Post-World War II Relations 
The Allied success in operations in Western Europe, particularly their landing on 
Normandy, changed the course of the War and put the Germans in retreat in all theatres, 
including the Balkans. By late November 1944, Albania was liberated. Following the 
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liberation of the country, the Albanian government officially requested recognition by the 
United States.77 In his official request Enver Hoxha claimed that his government was the 
only government representing Albania internally and externally. Furthermore, Hoxha 
indicated that the government had announced publicly its democratic principles and 
would protect and guarantee human rights.78 The Albanian government expressed the 
desire to be recognized without reservations and promised that it would “stand faithful in 
all sincerity to the cause of democracy and independence of the people.”79 (At that very 
moment nobody would ever have predicted that this note would start one of the most 
unfortunate periods in U.S.-Albanian relations, wherein both governments couldn’t arrive 
at satisfactory arrangements for the establishment of diplomatic relations and hence put 
Albania under communist domination for half a century.)  
Meanwhile, in domestic politics the prospect for any reconciliation between FNC 
and the Nationalists, as the United States had hoped during the war, seemed rather bleak. 
Leaders and other important members of Albanian anti-Communist movements Balli 
Kombetar and Legalitety had been evacuated from Albania. They had been put away by 
Allied military authorities in a camp at Santa Maria di Lucca, south of Brindisi, the 
nearest point in Italy to the Albanian mainland. Hoxha requested that these persons, 
whom he considered “war criminals”, should be returned for trial. Hoxha feared that the 
British had planned to send this group back to Albania to stir up organized resistance. 
The U.S. government’s position was that none of the Albanian war criminals were in 
American hands and urged that ultimate disposition of such persons be determined 
through an agreement between Albania and Allied governments.80  
                                                 
77 The Albanian representative in Caserta, Mr. Kadri Hoxha, presented the note to Mr. Alexander C. 
Kirk, who was simultaneously U.S. ambassador in Italy and political adviser to the Supreme Allied 
Commander, Mediterranean Theater. The note addressed to President Roosevelt, dated December 21, 1944, 
was signed by Hoxha. 
78 Only a couple of years later it turned out that the Albanian Communist regime was one of the most 
oppressive regimes of its kind. 
79 U.S. Foreign Relations, 1945, Vol. IV. p.4-5. 
80 Ibid., p.42. 
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On the other hand, the exiled leaders of two Nationalists’ movements, Midhat 
Frasheri81 and Sali Muftija,82 asked the U.S. government to take no measures toward 
recognition of Hoxha’s government, arguing that Hoxha’s communist regime did not 
represent the free will of the Albanian people. Further, they claimed that Hoxha’s regime 
had been imposed on the people not only by force but also by sheer terrorism.83 Mr. 
Frasheri and two other prominent leaders of Balli Kombetar sent another letter to the 
State Department by the end of April 1944, in which, among other issues, they requested 
that at a convenient time after the war was ended an impartial plebiscite be held “for the 
regions that belong to us [Albanians] ethnographically, because Albania should not be 
divided in two for the sake of imperialism and injustice.”84 
By November 1944, the State Department had already assembled a team for 
handling the Albanian affairs at Bari and designated U.S. General Consul to Cairo 
(Egypt) Joseph E. Jacobs as the head of the would-be American mission to Albania. 
When everything seemed to be going smoothly, a major shift of British policy toward 
Albania occurred.85 On November 3, 1944, the British embassy in Washington presented 
to the State Department a memorandum regarding the position of the British government 
toward Hoxha’s provisional government, which underlined that in the confusing situation 
in Albania, the British would send a military mission 86  to Albania but would not 
recognize the provisional government and expressed the hope that the United States 
government would concur.87 The United States decided to accept the British proposal for 
proceeding cautiously toward formal recognition as an appropriate approach, for obvious 
reasons. First, the approach of proceeding cautiously fully complied with the general U.S. 
                                                 
81 President of the Balli Kombetar (The National Front) Organization 
82 Representative of Legaliteti (Legality) Organization 
83 Letter sent to Secretary of State U.S. Foreign Relations, 1945, Vol. IV. p. 7. 
84 Ibid., p. 22. 
85 By early October 1944, British Government issued new directive toward Albania, which sated that 
British Mission to Nationalists would finally withdraw and negotiations sympathetic to Hoxha were about 
to start. For more on British position during that time see: U.S. Foreign Relations, 1944, Vol. III. p. 281. 
86 The British Military mission headed by Brigadier D.E.P. Hodgson arrived in Albania in January 
1945 and took over the British OSS (Office of Strategic Services) mission that was in Albania during the 
war. The team included also a political and economic adviser. 
87 U.S. Foreign Relations, 1944, Vol. III. p. 282. 
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policy toward provisional regimes in liberated countries as pronounced by President 
Roosevelt in his annual State of the Union address to the Congress. President Roosevelt 
emphasized that “[d]uring the interim period, until conditions permit a genuine 
expression of the people’s will, we and our Allies have a duty, which we cannot ignore, 
to use our influence to the end that no temporary or provisional authorities in the 
liberated countries block the eventual exercise of the people’s right freely to choose the 
government and the institutions under which, as free men, they are to live”.88 From this 
perspective, the situation in Albania was still not very clear. In many regards the civil war 
had overshadowed the war against the Axis occupiers, and the prospects for a free, 
democratic Albania seemed rather bleak. Second, the United States didn’t want to upset 
the Soviet Union, since it was agreed that for liberated countries of Europe the three 
principal Allies, Americans, British, and Soviets would consult each other on matters of 
international importance, such as recognition, boundaries, alliances, etc. The Yalta 
Declaration on Liberated Europe stated that the United States, Great Britain, and USSR 
would jointly assist people in Europe as liberated states to form internal governmental 
authority that would broadly represent all democratic elements of the population, and 
pledged to support their earliest possible establishment through free elections. 89  In 
addition, the British proposal coincided with meetings held in Moscow during October 
1944 between British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet Premier Joseph 
Stalin. Churchill and Stalin discussed postwar arrangements in Eastern Europe, 
particularly in the Balkans, and decided on respective “spheres of influence”.90 Although 
Albania  was  not  mentioned during the talks, it is likely that the policy toward Albania  
                                                 
88 For the text of President Roosevelt’s annual message to the Congress on the State of the Union, 
January 6, 1945, see Department of State Bulletin, January 7, 1945, p. 22. 
89  For text of the Declaration on Liberated Europe, included as part V of the report of the Crimea 
Conference, February 12, 1945, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 
971. 
90  On Churchill’s initiative the influence was expressed in percentage. Soviets secured 90% in 
Romania, 80% in Bulgaria, 80% in Hungary while Britain secured 90% in Greece. Yugoslavia was divided 
50-50. 
For more on Churchill-Stalin meetings see U.S. Foreign Relations 1944, Vol. III, P.1100-1180. 
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was the same as that toward Yugoslavia, for which “perhaps neither side cared enough or 
perhaps they recognized that partisans, who controlled substantial areas, might have a 
word to say.”91  
Third, although the State Department didn’t see any advantage to adopting 
entirely similar procedures with those of the U.K., the United States was in no way 
disposed to stepping ahead of the British in the matter of relations with Albania and did 
not want to embarrass them in their ongoing negotiations.92 Nevertheless, Secretary of 
State Hull also cautioned that Albanians generally had high regard for and particular 
confidence in the United States because of its disinterested position. He advised that the 
United States probably had to agree in general with the proposed British plan, but should 
not give the support of American prestige in Albania to the British if it would appear to 
prejudice the U.S. position.93 
Enthusiastic about their victorious war cooperation with the Allies against the 
Axis, Albanians had no doubt that after the promises made during the war, the 
provisional government would be recognized by all Allied powers promptly. 
Inexperienced in dealing with foreign policy issues, particularly with Great Power 
politics, as time went by Hoxha became very anxious, not only because his government 
was not being recognized but also because of the indifference shown toward him by 
Allied leaders. An ambitious leader, and possessed with the well known Albanian pride, 
Hoxha was very sensitive to the fact that he had addressed a written communication to 
the Allies leaders and had not received a written reply.94 
                                                 
91 R.A.C. Parker. P.253 
92  Anti-British sentiment was becoming intensive. At the time some unfortunate incidents had 
occurred between the British and FNC: British Land Forces, Adriatic made landings on the Albanian coast 
on December 5, 1944 without informing the FNC in advance; the British had not fulfilled their promises 
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led by General Napoleon Zervas had crossed the border in raids. Albanians saw the British position as 
favorable to Greece in this regard. 
93 U.S. Foreign Relations, 1945, Vol. IV. p.13. 
94 Ibid., p.15. 
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Unlike the British, the United States decided to proceed with sending a civilian 
team in an entirely informal capacity to gather the necessary information regarding the 
conditions and developments in Albania, as well as the extent to which the provisional 
government exercised authority in the country. This mission had to be entirely informal 
and, as the secretary of state advised, “should not give rise to conjecture on the part of the 
Albanians regarding the intentions of U.S. government in the matter of 
recognition.”95Hoxha gave an affirmative answer to the U.S. proposal and asked that the 
team be sent to Albania as soon as possible, “as quick actions would make a good 
impression.”96Furthermore, Hoxha promised that the U.S. team would be free to enter 
Albania with no conditions attached.  
Jacobs and his team97 arrived in Tirana on May 8, 1945. The following day he 
called on Hoxha and briefed him on the object of the mission and reiterated the official 
position of the United States toward Albania, including the U.S. support for Albanian 
independence and the conducting free elections in an appropriate time; the U.S. rejection 
of Albanian entry into a Yugoslav or wider federation; the insistence that questions of 
territorial disputes be addressed in a general settlement after the war; etc.98 Hoxha struck 
Jacobs as a forceful character with ambitions but suffering from effects of an inferiority 
complex because of his failure to win recognition. Throughout the meeting Hoxha 
expressed regret that Albania was the only country among those who resisted Axis 
powers that had not been recognized by Allied powers.99 The American representative in 
Tirana was skeptical from the very beginning as to Yugoslav and Soviet intentions, 
although Hoxha and members of his Cabinet rarely mentioned the Soviet Union.100 Even 
in cabling his first impressions, Jacobs emphatically stated that Albania was dominated 
by FNC and Hoxha’s government had overwhelming support in the country, particularly 
among the younger generation, while opposition was not well organized and came largely 
                                                 
95 Secretary of State to the Representative in Albania, Ibid., p.1. 
96 Ibid., p.17. 
97 Harry T. Fultz, economic adviser; Eric W. Hoffmann, special assistant; Anthony Stevens, clerk. 
98 For  U.S. policy toward Albania see Ibid., p.20. 
99 Ibid., p. 25 
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from the wealthy classes. 101  Despite considering the efforts of the members of the 
government as well-intentioned toward the well-being of the people, Jacobs predicted 
that “failure of the United States and Great Britain to recognize Hoxha’s regime will 
drive it completely into Yugoslavia-Soviet fold.”102 Although at that stage the Soviet 
influence was still an enigma for the U.S. representative, he sensed that the USSR was 
just awaiting developments103, preferring that the United States and Great Britain refuse 
to recognize Albania.104Jacobs emphasized the Albanian feeling of national identity and 
warned that any attempt to federate them with Yugoslavia or any other political units 
would encounter resistance and bloodshed. 
Two weeks before Jacobs’ report was presented, the British embassy in 
Washington had provided the State Department with the final report of the British 
mission in Albania. The British believed that the opposition movement was stronger and 
better qualified than Hoxha’s regime for governing the country. The British 
underestimated the effectiveness of the Hoxha’s regime and proposed reversing the 
policy toward Albania by supporting the opposition groups through coercive measures.105 
Jacobs disagreed with this conclusion and also with the British claim that the regime in 
Albania was fundamentally unfriendly to the United States and Great Britain.106 
On October 4, 1945, a consultative meeting was held in the Foreign Office in 
London between British107 and U.S.108 representatives for finalizing the procedures for 
                                                 
101 Ibid.,p. 39. 
102Jacobs described Hoxha’s Cabinet as “a sincere, patriotic group of individuals who were going to 
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 Ibid., p.26 
103 Soviet Military Mission arrived in Albania on July 18, 1945 and was headed by Colonel Sokolov.  
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recognition of the Albanian provisional government.  Mr. Jacobs insisted that recognition 
be given to the Hoxha regime, while British representatives showed some reservations 
regarding the issue of the Albanian-Greek frontiers. At the end it was decided that 
recommendation be given to both the U.S. and British governments that recognition be 
accorded, but that the act of recognition to be withheld until Albanian authorities had 
engaged themselves to hold free elections in the country. The British government, 
nevertheless, still insisted on the Greek claims and wanted to make a reservation that, in 
affording recognition, Great Britain did not recognize the present boundaries of Albania 
as final. After consultations with Jacobs, the U.S. ambassador in London, Winant, cabled 
to the secretary of state his view that except possibly for some very minor adjustment of 
the 1939 Albanian-Greek frontier, Greece had no valid claim to Albanian territory.  
Accordingly, I see no need for the U.S. to be overly sensitive to these 
Greek claims. We should be more concerned in gaining the good will of 
the Albanian people and the regime we propose to recognize, some of 
which we shall assuredly lose if we follow the Foreign Office 
suggestion.109 
In a concerted action the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union 
recognized Hoxha’s government as the provisional government of Albania on November 
10, 1945.110 It is worth noting that throughout his stay in Albania, Jacobs exercised a 
sympathetic understanding of the problems of the Albanian people, and his conclusions 
and recommendations provided bases for the American approach.  
The establishment of diplomatic relations by the U.S. government was conditional 
on three aspects. First, on assurances that genuine free elections would be held, all 
democratic groups and candidates would be fully safeguarded, and that foreign 
correspondents could enter Albania to report freely on elections. Second, that the 
Albanian government had to give the assurances that all treaties and agreements that were 
in force between the United States and Albania before the occupation by Italy, remained  
                                                 
109 U.S. Foreign Relations, 1945, Vol. IV. p. 64. 
110 Due to some technical reasons the note with the text of U.S. recognition didn’t arrive from 
Washington to the U.S. legation in Tirana until November 12. Therefore the U.S. note was presented two 
days after the Soviet and British notes. The Soviet note contained no conditions regarding recognition. 
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valid. Third, that the establishment of diplomatic relations should not be construed as 
prejudicing consideration of other questions of an international character involving 
Albania. 
In his reply Hoxha committed to conducting free elections and to freedom of 
reporting by the foreign press. Hoxha took the momentum and used the election as a 
cosmetic gesture for eliciting his government’s legitimacy in the eyes of Western 
powers.111 After the war Hoxha maintained the facade of cooperation with those non-
Communist resistance elements that were not opposing his policies of reconstructing the 
country. On December 2, 1945, general elections were held in Albania. Although 29 out 
of 111 candidates were independent, Hoxha’s Democratic Front (the renamed National 
Liberation Front) ran uncontested and won 93% of the votes.  Under conditions favorable 
to the government, the opposition could not make a far better showing than these 
independent candidates. News correspondents and foreign representative in the country 
visited various polling stations. A majority of correspondents commented favorably on 
the way elections were held and the friendly way they were received. Although the 
United States considered the elections as acceptable and recognized the results, the State 
Department did not want to abandon its policy of non-recognition, even if it was 
recognized that this course could hardly be expected to lead to substantial results. 
Thus the issue of treaties became the focal point of the negotiations between the 
two governments. Hoxha first requested that copies of such treaties be sent to the 
Albanian government, claiming that the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs either 
were destroyed or stolen by occupiers. Later Hoxha proposed that treaties be renegotiated 
after diplomatic relations were formally established. He claimed that according to the 
decision made at the Congress of Permet, 112all international agreements of King Zog 
were cancelled. Several notes followed between Washington and Tirana in which 
Washington insisted that the Albanian government first affirm the validity of the treaties 
and later examine them, while Hoxha requested that the procedure be the other way 
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112  “All agreements with the Foreign States, political and economic, which were made by the 
Government of Zog to the disadvantage of the Albanian people, are to be cancelled and new treaties 
drawn.” 
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around. Jacobs recommended to the State Department that insistence upon the U.S. 
position would delay recognition and lose considerable good will on the part of the 
United States, which was until that time more tolerant than either the British or the 
Soviets. “I do know how strongly the Department feels with respect to this matter but I 
suggest for consideration that we modify our position to extent of accepting the assurance 
with respect to treaties as set forth in Hoxha’s note, [which] indicate willingness upon 
receipt of copies to examine our treaties in the light of the Permeti resolution after 
establishment of relations.”113 The State Department informed Jacobs that it was not 
disposed to modify its position on continuing validity of the treaties.114 Understanding 
the U.S. persistence, Hoxha tailored somewhat his position and agreed to accept all 
eleven multilateral international agreements in which the United States and Albania were 
signatories.115 Arguably Hoxha made this concession as an effective tool for use in the 
ongoing negotiations for membership in the United Nations. 116  The United States 
rejected the offer and asked the government of Albania to “communicate the 
confirmation of the continued validity of treaties and agreements between the United 
States and Albania to the American Representative in Tirana at an early date.”117  
Several findings of Jacobs’ mission are important to better understand the 
situation in Albania during that time, particularly the limbo in which Albania’s future was 
held due to the myriad domestic difficulties and external factors. Above all, his 
observation that delays in recognizing the regime by the United States and Great Britain 
were affording advantages to the pro-Yugoslav and pro-Soviet element in the government 
proved to be the bitter truth. Domestically, pro-Yugoslav elements had tightened their 
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grip on power. This coincided also with a steady deterioration in the situation of the 
Albanian opposition. A new Albanian constitution was proclaimed which was virtually 
the same as the Yugoslav constitution. The state took control of industry, banking, and 
transportation, and a customs union emerged as the first step toward merging into the 
Yugoslav Federation. Besides fostering political and economic ties with Yugoslavia, a 
fast increase in Soviet prestige and activity had already started to occur in Albania. By 
early January 1946 the Soviet legation had been established, although still not fully 
staffed with political, economic, and military advisers.  
United States and British delays gave rise to the feeling that western Allies were 
indifferent to Albanian aspirations. Apart from ideological reasons, this was, in fact, one 
of the factors that drove Hoxha’s regime faster into the arms of Yugoslavia118 and later 
into the arms of the USSR. The more the Soviet presence increased, the more the 
relations with U.S. and British missions deteriorated. This was one of the most 
unfortunate developments in the history of Albania, which ironically was not inevitable. 
Several favorable factors could have made Albania follow a very different path.  
First, a comprehensive long-term strategy and a more active involvement of the 
United States and Great Britain could have retained the western orientation of the 
Albanian people, since in the early stages the Soviet Union had an inferior status in 
Albanian affairs compared with that of the United States and particularly the British, who 
had been working with Hoxha for fifteen months during the war. Unlike most countries 
of Eastern Europe where the course of events was determined less by local factors than 
by the decisive intervention of the Soviet Union, Albania was liberated without a single 
Soviet soldier setting foot on its territory. But unfortunately this fact remained just a 
historical statistic. Very soon Albania would fall under Soviet control, thus exceeding 
even Stalin’s prediction in the aftermath of the World War II that “whoever occupies a 
territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as 
                                                 
118 Although Tito’s Yugoslavs were Hoxha’s political mentors throughout the war, Yugoslavia didn’t 
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April 28, 1945. 
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far as his army can reach.”119 The dominant position that the Soviet Union enjoyed 
during the war in countries of Eastern Central Europe was nonexistent in Albania. 
Although Soviet policy toward Albania in the early stages after the war will not be dealt 
with in this paper, what is remarkable about the relationship between Moscow and 
Albania is not the support given by the former to Hoxha, but how very limited that 
support was.120 This seems to have been partly due to the special British interest in the 
Mediterranean. No Yugoslav troops went to fight in Albania, either; on the contrary, 
Albania’s contacts with Western powers were much more comprehensive than those with 
Yugoslavia and, needless to say, with the Soviet Union.  
Second, on the domestic front, despite the fact that communists won both national 
and civil wars, in the early stages after liberation Albania was obviously at a crossroad.  
Communism as an ideology didn’t have any tradition in the country121and even the 
resistance organized by FNC embodied a mixture of both revolutionary and nationalist 
ideas.  Particularly for that time, the Albanian government was no worse than others in 
the region. Most cabinet members and a large part of the population had direct ties with 
the West. The Albanian provisional government had twelve members, of whom eight had 
studied abroad: five in France, one in Italy, one in Russia, and one in Turkey, while the 
secretary of the National Liberation Council,122 Albania’s supreme legislative body, was 
a Harvard graduate. About twenty-five percent of Albania’s population had either been in 
the United States or had friends and relatives who had been there. In addition, several 
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thousand Albanians had been educated in American schools in Albania. Third, although 
Hoxha seemed to have made his decision to go east, during the first years after the war 
his position was still weak. The economy was in a total collapse.123 Politically, in order 
to consolidate his hold on power, Hoxha needed international recognition and 
respectability by Western countries, particularly by the United States and Great 
Britain.124 While the United States made many concessions with regard to the Romanian, 
Yugoslavian and Bulgarian settlements, it strengthened its opposition to the Albanian 
regime even further, which could hardly be interpreted as less than a substantial Soviet 
victory.125  
But, as a matter of fact, the American plans for the post-war period were based on 
a very low level of participation in the Balkan area. It was neither desired nor expected 
that U.S. military forces should be placed there. Although it was certainly assumed that 
efforts would be made to keep the area open for American economic interests, the 
political representation was to be small, as were relief and rehabilitation programs.126 
Above all, Albania was not important to the United States either politically or 
economically. The United States had some economic interests in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria 
and particularly in Romania, but its economic interests in Albania were insignificant.127  
In a very short time the situation was transformed to the point that the relations 
between Albania and the United States appeared to lead nowhere. The trend of 
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conversations with Hoxha indicated a lack of the cordiality which had characterized 
numerous conversations of his with the U.S. representative in Tirana.”128 Jacobs soon 
concluded that Hoxha’s government was biased in favor of Yugoslavia and the Soviet 
Union. “I feel certain that what has taken place here within short period of 6 weeks 
transforming an atmosphere of good will and democratic spirit at election time on 
December 2 to a regime of suspicion and fear is being forced upon Albanian authorities 
by small group Albanian Communists working hand in glove with Moscow and that 
majority members [of] Government are not only in sympathy but helpless.”129  
By March 1946, Albanian policy toward the United States was a carbon copy of 
Yugoslavia’s attitude, resembling the Soviet-style propaganda by slapping the U.S. 
positions on Albania in an organized radio and press campaign. To reverse the trend, 
Jacobs suggested that the State Department approach Moscow and discuss the Albanian 
affairs in view of the Yalta conference, but the State Department didn’t believe it 
advisable to discuss this issue with the Soviets. It became clear that since Moscow gave 
full support to the existing government in Albania, the Western powers had backed down. 
The relative unimportance of Albania lead the United States to not press further for any 
possible reversal of events in Tirana. What George Kennan had once noted in another 
context was also valid for Albania: “For the smaller countries of Eastern Europe, the 
issue is not one of communism or capitalism. It is one of independence of national life or 
of domination by a big power which has never shown itself adept at making any 
permanent compromises with rival power groups.”130  
Following the Yugoslav pattern, a series of trials were organized in the country in 
which a number of individuals were accused of sabotage and collaborating with the 
United States against the Albanian state. The economic adviser of the U.S. mission, Fultz, 
and some employees of the American mission, along with UNRRA’s representatives, 
were alleged to have instigated and subsidized sabotage activities at a draining project on 
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Lake Maliq, near Korca.131 Most of the individuals accused in this case, including Abdyl 
Sharra, chief engineer of the project; Kujtim Beqiri, engineer; and Pandeli Zografi, 
technician, were graduates of American Technical School operating in Albania before the 
war, in which Fultz was serving as principal. The United States considered the situation 
unacceptable and started to think of withdrawing the mission. From that moment on 
comments by both governments resembled reciprocal accusations, which only served to 
further deteriorate the situation, and on November 2, the United States decided to 
withdraw its mission from Albania.132  
It could be argued that the deterioration of relations between Albania and the 
United States (and of course Britain) was not entirely the fault of the Albanian 
government. In fact there is some room for this argument. Apart from backing down from 
the communist pressure, some steps of the Western governments further complicated the 
already volatile situation. Besides delays in recognizing Hoxha’s government, the United 
States and particularly Britain sent signals that appeared to endorse ongoing aspirations 
for partition of Albania by her neighbors, 133  thereby giving to the communists the 
opportunity to pose as the indispensable champions of Albanian independence and 
territorial integrity. Two particular cases had a significant effect in this regard. 
First, in a sudden move, by early August 1945 Brigadier Hodgson, the head of the 
British military mission, accused the Albanian regime of occupying Sazani (Saseno) 
Island, a small Albanian island about five miles off Vlora (Valona) harbor,134and advised 
the supreme Allied commander in the Mediterranean to protest such “aggressive action.” 
Hodgson’s recommendation later became official policy of the Foreign Office. In Jacobs’ 
observation, the Americans and the British knew that the island had been occupied by 
Albanian partisans, and he predicted that the British protest would come as a shock and  
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would strengthen the hands of those members of the regime who didn’t want any 
cooperation with the United States and Great Britain.135Jacobs further recommended that 
the U.S. government. 
should make a point-blank request of the British Foreign Office for a 
clarification of its real policy toward a setting up of an independent 
Albania and toward opposition groups in Albania and elsewhere. In other 
words, we should know whether the British Foreign Office is really 
desirous and prepared to support the establishment of an independent 
Albania. We should make it clear that we know of utterances of certain 
British officials who prefer to see the country divided up and the southern 
part added to Greece.136  
As for the Saseno Island matter, the State Department supported the 
recommendation of Jacobs and informed the British Foreign Office accordingly. 
Following the basic lines of U.S. policy regarding territorial disputes, the United States 
proposed that this issue be considered in the peace settlement. The issue was discussed at 
the third meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held in London on September 14, 
1945.137 Before the meeting King Zog sent a letter to the secretary of state protesting that 
Albania was not invited to represent herself in the conference, while her neighbors, Italy, 
Greece, and Yugoslavia had been invited. Zog expressed his disappointment that 
Albania’s future was being decided without her being given any voice in the decision and 
that no justification had ever been given for the discrimination against Albania. “All 
Albanians are of the same opinion, and they are far more concerned that their country 
should be represented as one of the United Nations than as to who should represent it. If 
Albania were invited to send representatives I feel certain they would reach agreement as 
to who should represent them.”138 However, the Council of Foreign Ministers decided 
the cession of the island of Saseno by Italy to Albania, but the overall sessions of the 
Council of Foreign Ministers terminated in a deadlock over procedures. The United 
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States supported the Council of Foreign Ministers’ decision and later rejected also the 
Italian proposal that Allied forces occupy this Island until its ultimate fate was settled by 
peace treaty.139 
Second, before the Paris Peace Conference,140 on February 19, 1946, U.S. Senator 
Pepper submitted a resolution 141  to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
supporting Greek claims on Northern Epirus (southern Albania). This proposal was later 
passed by the Senate. Albanians were disappointed and Hoxha requested clarifications 
from the U.S. government. The Department of State replied to Hoxha with not much 
clarity, indicating that actions taken by the Senate do not represent the attitude of the 
Executive Branch of the U.S. government.142 Understanding how vital this issue was to 
the existence of Albania, Jacobs urged that the Council of Foreign Ministers143 find some 
way to resolve the Albanian-Greek frontier; he made the following judgment of the 
problem: “…continual rattling this old claim by Greece seriously affects peace of 
Balkans and gives Albania excellent excuse to keep army fully mobilized and Soviet to 
pose as protector little Albania and to supply arms and military advisers. There is nothing 
that makes Albanians of all political and racial complexions… see red more quickly than 
proposal to give southern Albania to Greece.”144 
During the conference, on August 19, 1946, Greek Prime Minister Tsaldaris met 
with U.S. Secretary of State Byrnes to discuss the Greek-Albanian territorial disputes. 
Tsaldaris informed the secretary that Greece had decided to put forward to the Council of 
Foreign Ministers a resolution regarding this issue and asked for U.S. support. The 
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secretary agreed to support the Greek resolution but “was careful to make no 
commitment with regard to Greek territorial claims against Albania.”145 The ambiguous 
U.S. policy of dealing with this issue at the Paris peace conference was taken by Hoxha 
as a clear indication of U.S. support for Greek claims. Meanwhile, as predicted by Jacobs 
the conference was another opportunity for the Soviets and Yugoslavs to pose as the 
protectors of Albania, which initially was not invited to the conference. 146  At the 
proposal of Yugoslavia, and with the strong support of the Soviet Union, a delegation 
from Albania headed by Hoxha was later invited to present the Albanian position at the 
debate of the Council of Foreign Ministers.147  In his speech148  Hoxha glorified the 
Albanian resistance against Italy and Germany and strongly dismissed Greek accusations 
that Albania was part of the Axis powers. As a counterbalance to Greek territorial claims 
Hoxha raised the issue of Albanian Chams displaced by Greece during the war under 
pretext of their collaboration with the Axis powers.149After failing to negotiate even a 
lesser settlement for gaining some Albanian territories near Corfu, on October 1, 1946, 
the Greek delegation asked for another meeting with the U.S. secretary of state. The 
Greek delegation informed Byrnes that Greece had realized that at the time the situation 
was very unfavorable and that the Soviets would never agree to any solution satisfactory 
to the Greeks. Fearing that any decision taken would foreclose any future consideration 
of the question, the Greeks asked to leave the matter open and “neither raise it in the 
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future nor agree to its definite exclusion.”150  Secretary Byrnes agreed to the Greek 
proposal and therefore the resolution was withdrawn.   
These events consolidated the position of the regime in Albania and also gave a 
free ride to the Soviets, who claimed to have provided a protective shield to Albania. By 
February 1947 Hoxha tried to appease the United States, using the Yugoslavian 
government as mediator. During a meeting with Under Secretary of State Acheson, the 
Yugoslavian ambassador in Washington Sava Kosanovich raised questions about any 
possible U.S. approach toward Albania. But this time Americans were tired of supporting 
moves, which in Washington’s opinion could have little effect. Acheson was not disposed 
to talk about Albania. He indicated that U.S. patience with the Albanians was 
exhausted.151   
In the judgment of the U.S. representative in Albania, mistakes had been made by 
both Albania and the United States during the negotiations. “Albania, preoccupied with 
urgent problems of establishing stable, secure government, had perhaps overlooked 
international aspects of its efforts to achieve this; and the United States, preoccupied 
during same period with numerous international conferences of major importance to 
world peace, had perhaps overlooked the importance of a small, though strategic, 
Albania.”152  
The period 1945-1947 proved to be crucial for the history of Albania. After 
United States support was finally withdrawn, Hoxha’s regime fully embraced Stalinism 
and applied for almost half a century the most orthodox practices of a so-called 
“proletariat dictatorship” through collectivization, purges, and secret police.  
3. A Forty Year Absence of U.S.-Albanian Relations 
As indicated in a report of the Central Intelligence Agency regarding the situation 
in Albania, Hoxha’s government was still eager to resume relations with the United 
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States.153 In May 1949 Hoxha made another attempt to re-establish relations with the 
United States by sending message through the Albanian minister in France, Behar 
Shtylla. Minister Shtylla inquired of the State Department officials during his stay in New 
York 154  about any favorable view on the U.S. side for re-establishing relations, 
acknowledging that the Albanian government was ready to review the situation in the 
context of the new circumstances.155 In view of developments in Greece and convinced 
that any reconciliation with the Hoxha regime was hopeless, the United States in 
collaboration with the British had made a decision and already started preparations for 
toppling Hoxha’s regime by force. Therefore the Albanian offer was rejected. 
By late 1947, the British plan to take coercive measures to overthrow Albania’s 
regime had already prevailed in the Western intelligence community. British intelligence 
MI6 and the CIA organized the first Cold War attempt to roll back communism through 
covert force in a Soviet-dominated country. American and British intelligence experts 
hoped they would stir up trouble for Enver Hoxha's communist regime, thus creating an 
example for other Eastern European countries where some remaining guerrilla groups 
opposed to the communist regimes were still operational. With regards to the reaction of 
the Soviet Union to such an operation, the CIA concluded that it was highly unlikely that 
the Soviet Union would deliberately initiate a war with the West over Albania.156 CIA 
and MI6 at various training centers in Malta, Cyprus, and West Germany trained an anti-
Communist force, recruited from the Albanian-exile community. The first groups were 
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sent to Albania by late 1947. From the outset, however, the operation was doomed. The 
work of the Soviet mole H.A.R. Kim Philby, MI6's representative who was sent to 
Washington to work with CIA at the project's planning level, is thought to have ensured 
that these plans were passed via Moscow into the Albanian regime’s hands, and 
ambushes were laid before any of the agents arrived. In any event, the regime's grip on 
the country was such that the chances of an uprising succeeding were slim. The few 
agents who somehow survived the ambushes escaped from Albania and returned to a 
training camp in Malta, told of informers and fierce security and of locals everywhere 
being too afraid to offer help or even shelter. The belief that it was possible to overthrow 
or even undermine Albanian communism by sending in a handful of armed Albanians 
was not realistic. The strength of Hoxha's control of the country was critically 
underestimated and agents continued to parachute in or land by sea until late 1953. It is 
estimated that some three hundred Albanian refugees lost their lives during this 
operation.157 
After the failure of this operation, there was nothing remarkable in U.S.-Albanian 
relations for more than 30 years. The U.S. policy toward Albania resembled a lack of 
interest with containment policy vis-à-vis Soviet-dominated countries, while Hoxha 
continued his anti-American communist propaganda until his death in 1985. But Hoxha 
proved to be difficult to deal with even within the communist block. In 1948, after a 
Soviet-Yugoslav split, Hoxha rebelled against Tito and threw Albania into the arms of the 
Soviet Union. In 1949 Albania entered CMEA.158 With Albanian membership in the 
Warsaw Pact, in 1955 a Soviet naval base was established in southern Albania, thus 
giving the Soviets an entry to the Mediterranean. But the honeymoon with the Soviets 
didn’t last long. Signs of Soviet-Yugoslav reconciliation, the process of “de-
Stalinization” started by the new Soviet leadership after Stalin death, the emerging rift in 
Soviet-China relations, and the readiness of Khrushchev to discuss the possibility of 
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autonomy for the Greek minority in Albania, 159  gave Hoxha not only a degree of 
apprehension but also an opportunity to become a Chinese protégé. The dispute between 
Hoxha and Khrushchev became so grave that diplomatic relations between Moscow and 
Tirana were severed in 1961 and consequently the Soviet base in Albania was closed. 
From then on Albania refused to participate in CMEA and the Warsaw Pact 
activities,160and no more Soviet vessels were regularly stationed in the Mediterranean. 
Following these events Hoxha indicated a desire to move nearer to the West. He found 
approaching Western Europe to be ideologically less embarrassing than seeking any help 
from the United States.161 The minister of foreign affairs of Austria, Lujo Tonic-Sorinj, 
explained the Albanian government’s intention during a meeting with Secretary of State 
Rusk on October 5, 1966. Minister Toncic referred to approaches made by Hoxha, noting 
that “Albanians have indicated a desire to move nearer the West but they appear not to 
dare take any plunge and seem to be afraid of being repulsed by the West.”  Toncic asked 
the secretary if the United States expected any change on the part of Albania. Rusk 
speculated that Albanians could become restless under the monopoly of China and 
indicated “it would be a great mistake for the United States to try to probe the intentions 
of the Albanians.”162  Albania accepted Chinese “guidance” in political and military 
affairs, and between 1961 and 1975 received approximately half a billion dollars in 
interest-free credits from China.  Although Hoxha had already started his anti religion 
campaign, in 1967, inspired by Chinese Cultural Revolution, he succeeded in formally 
eradicating all worship practices in Albania, thus turning Albania into the first atheist 
state in the world.163Albania’s relations with China soured in the early 1970s, apparently 
because of a change that occurred in China’s foreign policy at this time. Hoxha 
disapproved the warming trend in Chinese-American relations, but particularly he was 
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angered when the Chinese leadership extended an invitation to Yugoslav leader Tito to 
visit China.164  Albania launched an anti-China campaign in mid-1977 that led to a 
discontinuation of all economic and military assistance and the withdrawal of all Chinese 
technical experts working in Albania. 
After breaking with China, Albania followed a policy of self-reliance, continuing 
to reject diplomatic relations with either the United States or the Soviet Union so long as 
Hoxha was alive, but did come out of her self-imposed isolation to a limited extent in the 
early 1980s. Albania opened talks with West Germany in an attempt to establish 
diplomatic relations165, and in fact several improvements were made in relations with 
Italy, Greece, and France. After the death of Hoxha in April 1985, a liberalization trend 
in foreign policy was becoming apparent, but economic conditions in the country 
worsened. In the meantime, the wave of political change sweeping across Eastern Europe 
in late 1989 affected Albanian domestic politics as well as her foreign relations. 
Concerned about extraordinary developments in Eastern Europe and particularly the 
dramatic events in Romania, Albania’s leadership launched a campaign of political 
liberalization. On the domestic front, the dynamics changed dramatically when by the end 
of June 1990, some 5,000 Albanians took refuge in dozens of foreign embassies in Tirana 
and demanded to be allowed to leave the country. After some early hesitation the 
government conceded to the request and the refugees were allowed to leave. This gesture 
on the part of the government probably only encouraged people to demand more, and 
consequently the issue of allowing political opposition parties came under discussion. 
Demonstrations began occurring periodically, and by late 1990 the communist 
government agreed to give up its monopoly on political power. Subsequently the first 
                                                 
164 Tito’s visit was a clear indication to Hoxha that Albania was not any more an important beachhead 
for China 
165 Albanian-West German differences were over Albania’s demand for $2 billion in reparations from 
the Federal Republic of Germany for damage done in Albania during WWII. Germany was unwilling to 
concede the principle of reparations, but did suggest the possibility of a loan or credits to finance a major 
industrial plant in Albania. Some improvement in relations became evident in 1984 when Franz Joseph 
Strauss, Premier of Bavaria, made a private trip to Albania, during which he met with various high officials 
in the country. Talks went on for almost three years until diplomatic relations were established in 
September 1987. 
 45
opposition party was created, the Democratic Party of Albania, followed by the 
appearance of opposition newspapers and the creation of additional opposition parties.  
4. Resumption of United States-Albanian Relations 
By early 1990 relations with the United States came back onto the Albanian 
agenda. The first contacts between American and Albanian diplomats occurred in May 
1990, but the United States government, concerned about Albanian internal 
developments, allowed the discussion to go on for some time before diplomatic relations 
were officially renewed in March 1991. 166  The official establishment of diplomatic 
relations with the United States coincided with the first multi-party elections. General 
elections held on March 31, 1991, whereby the opposition parties won in the big cities, 
but the communists managed to retain their hold over the countryside and won two-thirds 
of the seats in the Albanian Parliament. But the new mandate for the communist 
government lasted for only one month. The Albanian domestic political scene was 
already filled with demonstrations, political rallies, general strikes, and some violence. 
The communist government resigned and a new government followed. This time half of 
the 24 cabinet members came from the opposition parties. After the change in 
government, relations with the United States improved rapidly. The U.S. government 
supported Albania’s membership applications to international organizations and promised 
humanitarian assistance. In June 1991, the U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker paid a 
remarkable visit to Albania during which he addressed hundreds of thousands of 
Albanians167 gathered in a rally held in the main square of Tirana on the occasion of his 
visit. Secretary Baker encouraged Albania’s democratization process and pledged U.S. 
support.168 Although the economic aid offered by Secretary Baker to Albania was modest 
($6 million), its symbolic significance to Albania was very important, as it pointed to 
possible future U.S. support. Furthermore, Baker cautioned that the future of Albanian-
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American relations would depend on Albania’s continued pursuit of democratization.169 
In November of that year, Albanian Prime Minister Ylli Bufi paid the first ever visit of an 
Albanian premier to the United States. Although his visit technically was not in an 
official capacity, Bufi did meet with U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs 
Arnold Kanter and with members of the House foreign affairs and Senate foreign 
relations committees. In addition Bufi met various U.S. officials in departments of 
Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, and officials from the World Bank with whom he 
discussed Albanian economic needs. He also signed an agreement with the Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation that was intended to guarantee American investments in 
Albania. But given the devastating economic and political situation in the country, such 
moves were too little if not too late. The government was not able to deal with the myriad 
problems 170 , and after the opposition pulled out, the government collapsed. 171  A 
technical government followed for preparing the new elections that were scheduled for 
March 22, 1992. Meanwhile the opposition leader, Sali Berisha, visited the United States 
twice and was able to receive the full support of the U.S. government and various 
Congressional leaders. Understanding the challenges to democratization, the United 
States publicly supported the opposition parties in Albania and, in a unique move, U.S. 
Ambassador to Tirana, William Ryerson, participated in opposition rallies.172 The U.S. 
support proved to be of critical importance for the landslide victory of the opposition in 
the March 22nd  elections. On April 9, 1992, the new Albanian Parliament elected Berisha 
as president of the republic, Albania’s first noncommunist president since the end of 
World War II.173  
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II. NEW ERA OF UNITED STATES-ALBANIAN RELATIONS 
The new government created after the election of 1992 introduced an ambitious, 
Western-oriented program of much-needed economic and democratic reforms to 
overcome Albania’s longtime isolation and economic stagnation.  The United States and 
Western European countries hailed the program and pledged to support the full transition 
from a centralized socialist system to a liberal market economy. Albanian relations with 
the United States underwent major changes. In fact, after the Cold War, the United States 
had been generally responsive to approaches from post-communist governments of 
Eastern Europe for closer, stronger, and more long-lasting relations, but particularly due 
to the situation in the Balkans, Berisha’s emphasis on relations with the United States met 
with much interest in Washington.174 The United States and the NATO alliance were 
very much concerned that the destabilization of the Balkans could threaten Western 
interests.  Therefore, the integration of this region into a Euro-Atlantic security structure 
was envisaged. Albania officially requested to become a NATO member and in June 
1992 was admitted into the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.175 Berisha was invited 
to Washington in June 1992 to meet with President Bush at the White House, thus 
starting a new era in the relations between the two countries in the political, economic, 
and military fields. Fearing that the conflict in Yugoslavia could be spread into Kosovo 
and then to Albania, Berisha pleaded for help and regarded the United States as a 
protector. Although the United States made no official commitment to Albania’s security 
at that time, the Bush Administration, worried about the spillover of the Bosnia conflict 
in Kosovo and other neighboring areas, by the end of December 1992 made a deterrent 
threat known as the “Christmas warning” to the Serbian government, indicating that the 
United States was prepared to take unilateral military action against any conflict 
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spillover.176 (The Clinton Administration reiterated the Christmas warning a few weeks 
after President Clinton’s inauguration). It is worth noting that throughout the crises in the 
Balkans, Albania has been encouraged and praised by the U.S. government for its 
constructive role in resolving several of the inter-ethnic conflicts in the region, promoting 
peaceful dispute resolution and discouraging ethnic-Albanian extremists.177 
A. U.S.-ALBANIAN DEFENSE AND SECURITY RELATIONS, 1992-1997 
One of the most distinctive features of U.S.-Albanian relations is the countries’ 
bilateral cooperation on defense and security issues, which besides the eagerness of 
Albanian authorities to start a close relationship with the U.S., has been based on two 
aspects: 
First, the strategic location of Albania and the potential role she may play in the 
regional security. U.S. planners have considered Albania pivotal to the security of the 
region due to Albania’s strategic location and the fact that large Albanian communities 
live throughout the Balkans. Thus helping Albania enhance internal stability and facilitate 
its political and economic integration has been perceived to be in the United States’ 
national interest. A stable, prosperous Albania would be in a good position to help U.S. 
efforts to promote peace in the region and to combat terrorism, arms proliferation, and 
international organized crime.178 
Second, the U.S. leadership believed that military reform was essential in 
transforming the societies of Eastern European countries, and through cooperation with 
their defense establishments, the Defense Department could play a key role in helping 
them to build democratic institutions. As Secretary of Defense William Perry noted, 
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[I]n all of those countries, the military represents a major force. In many 
cases, it is the most cohesive institution. It often contains a large 
percentage of the educated elite, and it always controls key resources. In 
short, it is an institution that can either support democracy or subvert it. In 
these new democracies, we can choose to ignore this important institution 
or we can try to exert a positive influence.179 
The U.S. had already initiated a partnership program in which state national 
guards partnered with comparably sized Central or Eastern European countries to help 
them reform the military according to democratic principles. As part of this program, in 
January 1993, the first bilateral agreement was signed between the Ministry of Defense of 
Albania and the United States European Command, and a military liaison team (MLT) 
from the South Carolina National Guard was dispatched to the Ministry of Defense of 
Albania. 180  In October 1993 Secretary of Defense Les Aspen invited Minister of 
Defense of Albania Zhulali to Washington. A Memorandum of Understanding on 
Defense Cooperation was signed that created the necessary conditions for increased 
Albanian and American bilateral defense cooperation.181 In January 1995 the first U.S.-
Albanian bilateral working group, later known as the bilateral defense consultations, was 
held in Tirana to discuss defense and security matters. Albania agreed to host a U.S. 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) Unit for conducting reconnaissance missions over 
Bosnia in support of U.N. peacekeepers. The stationing of UAVs in the Gjadri air base 
was warmly hailed by the United States, since even some NATO countries had 
previously refused to host them. Following the hosting, a constant flow of American 
                                                 
179 William Perry. Preventive Defense. Address at a North American luncheon in New York City on 
May 23. For full speech see http://www.trilateral.org/nagp/regmtgs/96/0523perry.htm. Accessed August 4, 
2004) 
180 Later, as part of a rearrangement, New Jersey was assigned as primary partner while the New York 
National Guard was assigned as associate partner for Albania. 
181 Other memorandums signed for defense cooperation between the U.S. and Albania: Memorandum 
of Understanding between Albania and US European Command for sending to Albania the Military Liaison 
Team, signed in January 1993; Memorandum of Agreement on Hydrographic Studies, signed in July 1994; 
Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Albania and the Government 
of USA on providing communication equipment SY-71E to Albania (signed in 1998); Memorandum of 
Understanding between U.S. Task Force and the Directorate of Civilian Aviation for the Control of Rinas 
Airport (signed in May 1999); Memorandum on Security Agreement between USA and Albanian 
Government regarding Security Measures for the Protection of the Military Classified Information (signed 
in 1995); Agreement between USA and Republic of Albania for the destruction of Ammunition (signed in 
December 2001). 
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military personnel traveled to and from  Albania to give advice and check the situation. 
The first Albanian military officers were sent to U.S. military institutions for training 
under the IMET program.182 By 2001 about $2.7 million was allocated for the training 
of 140 Albanian military officers in U.S. schools and military academies. In 1994 
Albania became eligible to receive excess defense articles from the United States under 
the EDA program; thus a considerable number of articles were selected and shipped to 
Albania, including vehicles, trucks, three patrol boats, etc., from U.S. bases in Europe 
and elsewhere.183 The U.S. Department of Defense responded positively to the request 
made by the minister of defense for a defense adviser to the Ministry of Defense of 
Albania.184 The Albanian government repeatedly requested that U.S. military bases be 
stationed in Albania. When building permanent bases appeared impractical from a U.S. 
perspective, Zhulali asked for more of a U.S. presence in Albania through conducted 
bilateral exercises. He also proposed that a national training center be built in the Biza 
region, which would be used for training by Albanian and U.S. military personnel, and 
could be offered for NATO exercises as well. A series of bilateral exercises followed, 
reaching a climax in 1995 when 12 such exercises were conducted. Some of these 
                                                 
182  International Military Education and Training. The United States as the largest Western education 
provider began to train and educate foreign servicemen in 1947 within IMET. Since its inception it has had 
two broad missions: first, to provide professional military education and military training for allied or 
friendly armed forces, and second, to expose foreign military personnel to democratic values, respect for 
human rights and belief in the rule of law. See for details, Duncan L. Clarke, Daniel B. O’Connor, Jason D. 
Ellis, Send Guns and Money: Security Assistance and U.S. Foreign Policy. Westport Praeger, 1997.  
183 Excess Defense Articles. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act 
authorize offering to foreign governments defense articles declared as excess by the military departments in 
support of U. S. national security and foreign policy objectives.  Typically, EDA is transferred to support 
U. S. allies in their modernization efforts. Until December 2000 Albania received under EDA about $34 
million including over 160 military vehicles and other excess articles  
184 For a full account of the activity of the U.S. defense adviser in Albania, see C. Dennison Lane. 
Once Upon an Army: The Crisis in the Albanian Army, 1995-1996. Ministry of Defense of the United 
Kingdom: Conflict Studies Research Centre, G114, September 2002. 
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exercises were of a humanitarian nature such as “Uji Kristal”185 (Clear Water) and 
“MEDEX 95.” Others, such as “SAREX 95” and “Peaceful Eagle 95”186 were focused 
on training the Albanian military in search and rescue missions, as well as peacekeeping 
operations. In July of 1995, the joint U.S.-Albanian military exercise “Rescue Eagle 95” 
was conducted on the Albanian coast, in which approximately 1,700 Marines of the 24th 
Marine Expedition Unit participated. These exercises were followed by frequent visits of 
U.S. ships to the main Albanian port of Durres.  
Albania became eligible to buy non-lethal military equipment from the United 
States with funds provided under the FMF program.187 A Security Assistance Office was 
attached to the Ministry of Defense of Albania for coordinating FMF, EDA, and IMET 
programs.188 During a visit to Washington in September 1995, Berisha asked President 
Clinton for more U.S. military assistance to Albania and, in a meeting at the Pentagon, he 
discussed with Secretary of Defense Perry the possibility of supporting the Albanian navy 
for its coast guard duties.189 The U.S. was very interested in regional security cooperation 
and encouraged Albania in this direction. In 1995 Albania sent a company-size unit to 
Bosnia as part of Stabilization Force (SFOR), and ever since, the unit has been rotating in 
                                                 
185 In July 1994, during a tour of the region in support of humanitarian efforts, the spouses of 
Secretary Perry, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Policy Joe Kruzel, who 
died on a peace mission in Bosnia in August 1995, and Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of 
Defense Army Maj. Gen. Paul Kern visited the military hospital in Tirana. They witnessed the difficult 
situation in the hospital and realized that since it was a military facility it could not receive humanitarian 
assistance. They encouraged the Pentagon to find an appropriate way to assist the Albanian military in this 
regard. “Uji Kristal” followed, during which considerable work was done by South Carolina Guardsmen, 
including building two wells. The Albanian government named a hospital wing honoring Joe Kruzel; a 
plaque in the trauma center bears his name. 
186 Approximately 150 U.S. and 150 Albanian soldiers participated in a combined peacekeeping 
exercise September 11-21, 1995, near Durres, Albania. Peaceful Eagle '95 was the first combined, bilateral 
peacekeeping exercise between U.S. and Albanian soldiers conducted in that country. It involved about 150 
engineers from the 3rd Inf. Div., and as many Albanian soldiers from the Shijaku Division, some of whom 
had trained with U.S. soldiers at Fort Polk, La., in a Partnership for Peace exercise called Cooperative 
Nugget '95.  
187  Foreign Military Financing. The U.S. launched Foreign Military Financing, known also as 
Warsaw Initiative, in 1996 to assist Partnership for Peace countries aspiring to NATO membership. Until 
2002 Albania received $14.5 million in U.S. military equipment and technical assistance under FMF. 
188 In 2002 the Office was upgraded to Defense Cooperation Office and took over also the Military 
Liaison Team. 
189 The U.S. agreed to send to Albania three patrol boats as part of the EDA program and also to sell 
to Albania two brand new patrol boats. 
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and out of Bosnia every six months. This was the first time Albania sent troops for a 
peacekeeping mission outside the country, and such a move has been always regarded by 
the United States as a significant investment, taking into account the modest capabilities 
of Albania.  
The U.S. Administration believed that building trust and understanding between 
the militaries of neighboring nations meant building trust and understanding between the 
nations themselves.190 In this regard Albania was considered an appropriate place to start 
building a new partnership among countries of the region. With the support and full 
financial sponsorship of the United States, two major events took place in 1996: The 
Southeastern European Defense Ministerial was convened in Tirana from March 31 to 
April 1, with the participation of ministers of defense from Albania, Bulgaria, 
Macedonia, Italy, Turkey, and the United States.191 During the conference, the ministers 
discussed regional security and cooperation, including peacekeeping missions, and 
humanitarian and disaster relief. They also discussed exchanging military information, 
conducting joint exercises and training, and improving civil/military relations. The 
ministers decided to continue with such meetings on an annual basis.192  Although this 
meeting didn’t elaborate any final document, it carried a symbolic significance for the 
troubled region of the Balkans, since it was the first time that the ministers of defense of 
these countries met and openly discussed their security concerns. The U.S. secretary of 
defense encouraged the countries of the region to build a new security partnership, 
emphasizing the need for openness among the countries regarding defense budgets, plans 
and strategy by noting that “no country in the region should have to guess about the 
capabilities or intentions of its neighbors.”193  
                                                 
190 William Perry. Preventive Defense. Address at a North American luncheon in New York City on 
May 23. For full speech see http://www.trilateral.org/nagp/regmtgs/96/0523perry.htm. Accessed August 4, 
2004) 
191 Greece refused to participate in this event due to tensions with Turkey at that time.  
192 In the following meeting held in Bulgaria in October 1998, besides 9 countries of the region, the 
following countries participated as observers: Belgium, Canada, The Czech Republic, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, The Netherlands and The United Kingdom. For a 
chronology of events of SEDM, see http://www.seebrig.pims.org/sedmcc.htm. 
193 Ushtria dhe Koha, April 2, 1996. 
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During the summer of 1996, a major multilateral exercise codenamed “Peaceful 
Eagle 96” was conducted in the vicinity of Tirana with the participation of troops from  
Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Italy, Turkey, Romania, and the United States.194 
This was the biggest exercise ever held in the region; some 2,000 troops from all 
participant countries took part.  
The excellent defense cooperation between the United States and Albania was 
capitalized with the exchange of a series of high-level defense officials. Between 1992 
and 1996 Albania was visited by Secretary of the Army Togo West, by the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye, by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General 
Shalikashvili, and by other high-level civilian and military officials from the Pentagon. 
Most important during this period, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry visited 
Albania twice195, while Minister of Defense of Albania Zhulali visited Washington three 
times in full official capacity.196 Throughout this period the United States supported and 
encouraged the official request of Albania for NATO membership, as well as Albanian 
participation in the Partnership for Peace Program.  
In the meantime, on the domestic front due to harsh political fighting 
accompanied by a political gridlock and the lack of experience in dealing with challenges 
created by the new political and economic system, a slowing of reforms occurred in the 
mid-1990s. Taking credit for the democratization of the country and opening of Albania 
toward the West, Berisha had already started to become authoritarian. But still the 
Clinton administration wanted to avoid weakening or antagonizing Berisha, who was 
viewed as a friend and whose government had contributed to stability in the 
                                                 
194 The U.S. was represented in this exercise by an intermediate staging base ISB in Ancona, Italy. 
Units crafted in the ISB were the 22d ASG, two movement control teams from the 14th Transportation 
Battalion at Vicenza, US Army Reserve (USAR) soldiers from the 314th Support Center at Vicenza, and a 
port management team from the 1321st Medium Port Command at Livorno, Italy. To support this JCS 
exercise, NMCB 40 deployed 39 personnel to Rinas and Biza, Albania.  
195 Secretary Perry visited Albania in July 1994 and in April 1996. 
196 Minister Zhulali visited Washington five times during his tenure as minister of defense. Three of 
these visits were in full official capacity: October 1993; July 1994; October 1995; January 1996; September 
1996. 
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region.197Meanwhile the general elections of May 1996 had been strongly criticized by 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The U.S. criticized the 
election198 and called for a comprehensive re-run of the ballot. When such calls were 
ignored, the U.S. administration backed away from supporting “the increasingly 
authoritarian Albanian president.” 199  Gabriel Partos, a prominent analyst of Balkan 
issues, argues that the severing of U.S.’s special links with the Berisha administration 
was made easier for Washington by the decline in Albania’s strategic importance 
following the Dayton Peace Accords on Bosnia-Herzegovina.200 The political stability of 
the country weakened and a boom of the informal economy, followed by a rising of 
pyramid schemes, almost paralyzed the country’s economy and reforms. During a 
meeting held in October 1996 at the Department of State between the Undersecretary of 
State for Global Affairs Timothy Wirth and Minister of Defense of Albania Safet Zhulali, 
the United States warned the Government of Albania of the possible collapse of the 
pyramid schemes and of the likely consequences.201 As feared, the pyramid schemes 
couldn’t be managed and they collapsed, thus bringing about a serious crisis with severe 
political, social and economic consequences.202 The May 1996 parliamentary elections 
had already damaged the relations of Berisha with the U.S. administration and, therefore, 
by the time the unrest began, neither Berisha nor the U.S. representatives seemed to be 
interested in consulting each other.203 Harsh criticism toward the United States emerged 
in Parliament from Berisha’s ruling party members, some of whom went as far as to 
argue that the collapse of the pyramid schemes was a CIA-led operation designed to 
                                                 
197 Minton F. Goldman. Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe: Political, Economic, 
and Social Challenges. New York: M.E.Sharpe, p. 72. 
198 For more on the U.S. position toward the election, see Elez Biberaj, Albania in Transition, chapter 
7 & 8. 
199 Washington Post 
200 Gabriel Partos. Albania: Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management, December 1997. London: 
The International Security Information Service, p. 5. 
201 The author was a participant in this meeting. 
202  For more on the 1997 crisis, see Gabriel Partos. Albania: Conflict Prevention and Crisis 
Management. London: The International Security Information Service, December 1997. 
203 After the election Berisha refused to meet U.S. Undersecretary Timothy Wirth and the Chairman 
of the Albanian Caucus in Congress, Elliot Engel, Congressman from New York. 
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disrupt Albania. In response to this criticism the U.S. ambassador in Albania expressed 
anger and stated that the U.S. government had criticized the government of Albania 
openly and in a constructive way by adding that irresponsible politicians who want to 
inflame the situation for their own purposes choose to interpret this criticism as “a hidden 
agenda aiming at destroying the country”.204 Albania couldn’t respond effectively to the 
crisis without the help of the international community. Upset with the U.S. position, 
Berisha avoided calling for help to the U.S.-dominated NATO and instead appealed to 
the Western European Union for “military aid to restore the constitutional order and to 
safeguard the integrity of Albania,” 205  a move that coincided with the Clinton 
Administration’s decision to let Europeans deal with the crisis in Albania. 206 The 
European Union, in concerted efforts with the OSCE, responded quickly by sending a 
multinational force to Albania to help restore order and create the appropriate conditions 
for holding new elections.207 Despite the fact that the United States was not part of a 
multinational force in Albania, the Clinton Administration encouraged all political parties 
to reach a peaceful solution and repeatedly supported the integrity of Albania throughout 
the crisis. Unquestionably the crisis of 1997 was a setback in the relations of Berisha with 
the U.S. administration, but most important, the crisis was a serious setback in 
democratic developments in Albania.  
The new government created after the July election tried to restore order and 
bring the economy back on track. In international affairs, Nano’s government pursued a 
policy of recovering the shaken relations with the United States and at the same time 
approaching the European Union. But political stability remained fragile throughout 
1998. Another crisis occurred in September that year when demonstrations erupted in the 
capital city to protest the killing of a prominent opposition leader. Soon the protests 
                                                 
204 Statement of U.S. Ambassador in Albania to the Albanian press on March 27, 1997. For the full 
text, see Albanian Telegraphic Agency at: http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/ata/1997/97-03-28.ata.html#08 
205 Albanian Telegraphic Agency, http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/ata/1997/97-03-13.ata.html#12 
206 For more on U.S. and European reaction to the crisis in Albania, see Gabriel Partos. Albania: 
Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management. London: The International Security Information Service, 
December 1997. 
207 Elections were held in July 1997 in which the opposition coalition led by the Socialist Party scored 
a landslide victory. Berisha resigned following the result of the election. The Parliament elected Rexhep 
Meidani as President of Albania for a five-year term. 
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turned violent, and the stability of the country was again in question. The United States 
and the European Union reacted by condemning the violence and requesting that order be 
restored. President Clinton sent a message to Albanian President Rexhep Meidani in 
which he condemned the use of violence for achieving political ends in Albania by noting 
that the guiding principles for all countries seeking to build democracy must be support 
of democratic institutions and the rule of law. He emphasized that the “warm friendship 
between the Albanian and the American peoples is at the heart of the good relations 
between our two countries.”208 
B. THE CRISIS OF KOSOVO AND UNITED STATES-ALBANIAN 
SECURITY RELATIONS 
While the security and economic situation in Albania was slowly recovering, the 
situation in Kosovo was exploding.209  In December 1997, NATO Foreign Ministers 
confirmed that NATO’s interest in Balkan stability extended beyond Bosnia to the 
surrounding region, and expressed concern at the escalating ethnic tension in Kosovo.210 
Throughout 1998 diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful, negotiated solution were 
undertaken by the international community. In the late summer and fall of 1998, U.S. 
officials began to consider major combat operations to protect civilians in Kososvo from 
                                                 
208  Albanian Telegraphic Agency, September 24, 1998. For the full text of President Clinton’s 
message see http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/ata/1998/98-09-24.ata.html#19. 
209 The seeds of confrontation in Kosovo were sown long ago. Throughout history Kosovo has been 
mostly inhabited by Albanians and has had a special place in Albanian history. At the same time Kosovo 
has had significance in Serbian history and thinking. In 1389, Serb forces were defeated by the Ottomans at 
the battle of Kosovo Polje. In 1913, after the Balkan Wars, Kosovo became part of Serbia, despite the 
ethnic Albanian majority, and later became part of Yugoslavia. Under the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution, 
Kosovo became an autonomous province within Serbia. But from the late 1980s Kosovo was increasingly 
affected by a rise in Serb nationalist sentiment. Slobodan Milosevic gained power in Serbia in 1987 and in 
1990 the autonomy given to Kosovo in 1974 was revoked. During the 1990s, Kosovo Albanian resistance 
to rule from Belgrade grew. By and large, this was passive. However, after the Dayton Accords, which 
didn’t address the Kosovo issue, a more radical agenda emerged. Stepping up their program of 
independence, Kosovar Albanians not only demanded autonomy from the Serbs, but initiated a movement 
to cede Kosovo from Serbia to become an independent Kosovo. An armed resistance followed, which led 
to the creation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The KLA began a campaign of attacks against 
Serbian security forces, who responded with military repression of the population. For more on Kosovo 
history and developments, see Noel Malcolm. Kosovo: A Short History. New York: University Press, 
Second Edition, 1999; Tim Judah. Kosovo: War and Revenge. Yale University Press, Second Edition. 
2002;  Miranda Vickers. Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosova. C. Hurst & Co, 1998. 
210 See NATO’s Handbook 
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ethnic cleansing.211NATO defense ministers, therefore, decided in June 1998 to task 
NATO military planners to produce a range of options, both ground and air, for military 
support to the diplomatic process. The Kosovo crisis brought back to full speed the U.S.-
Albanian relations. U.S. planners considered Albania as a staging area for possible 
operations in Kosovo. The Albanian government fully supported the international 
community’s efforts to resolve the crisis and expressed its willingness to make available 
to the United States and NATO all military facilities, including the right of the Alliance 
to use Albanian maritime and air space. In response to the escalation of the conflict, 
NATO undertook a series of air and ground exercises to demonstrate the Alliance’s 
ability to project power rapidly into the region. Albania hosted many of those exercises. 
In mid-June 1998 a NATO air maneuver, codenamed Determined Falcon, took to the 
skies over Albania 212 while NATO Partnership for Peace exercise “Co-operative 
Assembly” took place in Albania from July 17-22. Another exercise, dubbed 
"Cooperative Assembly 1998," was held in Albania from Aug. 17-22, 1998. The exercise 
involved ground and air forces by bringing together more than 1,200 troops from the 
United States, Canada, Germany, France, Greece, Spain, Britain, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Turkey, Italy, Albania, and Lithuania.213 
In March 1998, President Clinton faced the most serious foreign policy crisis of 
his presidency when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization launched a massive air strike 
upon Yugoslavia to secure the rights of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.214 The bombing was 
carried out largely by American forces and lasted for seventy-eight days until the 
Yugoslav government agreed to NATO’s terms in June. Yugoslavian President Slobodan 
Milosevic was forced to end his repression of the Kosovo Albanians.  
During the operation, Albania played host to some seven thousand U.S. troops 
deployed in support of Allied operations. NATO's supreme Allied commander of Europe, 
                                                 
211 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States. Official Government Edition, p. 119. 
212 Christian Science Monitor, June 16, 1998. 
213 Pentagon briefing, 23 August 1998. 
214 For a full account of NATO’s air operation in Kosovo, see Wesley K. Clark. Waging the Modern 
War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat. New York: Public Affairs. 2002. 
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Gen. Wesley Clark, requested the additional weapon systems in support of the operation 
Allied Force. On April 4, 1999, the United States offered and NATO accepted 24 Army 
AH-64A Apache attack helicopters (Task Force Hawk) to aid in Operation Allied 
Force. 215  In March 1999 Task Force Hawk was originally directed to deploy to 
Macedonia, but the Macedonian government determined it could not allow helicopters to 
be based there. Therefore the deployment had to be shifted to Albania, where the 
government had agreed to accept them and offered as the location for Task Force Hawk 
the only international airport in Albania at Rinas (Tirana). About 5,000 U.S. soldiers 
were part of the deployment to Albania.216  
The crisis of Kosovo further deteriorated the already volatile security situation in 
Albania due to the large number of refugees (about 500,000) arriving from Kosovo. 
NATO, the United States, and the European Union supported Albania through large-scale 
humanitarian operations, such as “Allied Harbor,” 217  “Sustain Hope,” 218  “Shining 
Hope,” etc. On April 13, 1999, NATO approved plans for Allied Harbor, its first 
humanitarian operation ever. Allied Harbor was led by Lt. Gen. John Reith, U.S. Army, 
who was at the same time the commander of the NATO Forces operating in Albania, 
                                                 
215 For more see Pentagon press briefing April 4, 1999.  
216 Besides 24 Apache helicopters, Task Force Hawk’s deployment involved an Army Aviation 
Brigade Combat Team. This unit included a corps aviation brigade headquarters, a corps artillery 
brigade headquarters with a Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) battalion, an attack helicopter 
regiment (Apache), a ground maneuver brigade combat team, a corps support group, a signal battalion, 
a headquarters troop battalion, a military police detachment, a psychological operations detachment, 
and a special operations command-and-control element. For more, see Global Security Website at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/ah-64a-ops.htm. (Accessed on September 3, 
2004.) 
217 The preparation for the deployment of a NATO force to Albania to conduct a humanitarian mission 
began on 7 April, when a NATO team led by Italian Mag. Gen. Pasqualino Verdecchia, deployed from 
Headquarters Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) to co-ordinate NATO plans with Albanian 
authorities. A team of the AMF(L) (Allied Command Europe Mobile Force/Land) led by the AMF(L) 
commander, Lt.Gen. John Reith, arrived in Tirana on 10 April to make final preparations for the 
deployment of this NATO Immediate Reaction (Land) headquarters. 
218 Operation Sustain Hope was the U.S. humanitarian effort to bring in food, water, medicine and 
relief supplies for the refugees fleeing from the former republic of Yugoslavia into Albania and Macedonia. 
The overall objective of Operation Sustain Hope was to maintain stability in the region and prevent a 
humanitarian disaster and to provide for the security of the refugees. 
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AFOR.219 Lt. Gen. Reith conducted meetings with the Albanian president and other high-
level officials who pledged full support to the operation. The United States’ contribution 
to  Allied  Harbor  was  Joint  Task  Force  (JTF)  Shining  Hope,  commanded  by  Major  
General William S. Hinton Jr., United States Air Force.220 By late 1999 almost all 
Kosovo refugees were returned home, thus concluding the first NATO humanitarian 
operation. In recognition of NATO’s support during the Kosovo crisis, the president of 
Albania awarded AFOR the Order of Skenderberg, Albania’s highest award.221  
The credibility of the United States during and after the crisis of Kosovo reached 
an even higher level among Albanians. On the other hand, although Albania is a small 
and rather poor country by U.S. standards, the security partnership between the two 
countries was fostered during the crisis. Most important, Kosovo’s crisis underscored 
Albania’s utility as a staging area for NATO and U.S. operations in the region.  
After the Kosovo crisis the U.S. continued to promote regional security initiatives 
and encourage countries of the Balkans to cooperate in regional security issues. 
Therefore, much emphasis was attached to the South Eastern European Defense 
Ministerial’s (SEDM’s) initiatives.  On August 1999, SEDM activated the South Eastern 
European Brigade, SEEBRIG, a regional, multinational and military organization, made 
                                                 
219 Forces for Allied Harbor (around 8,000) were provided by Albania, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Hungary, Luxemburg, Lithuania, Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United 
Kingdom and United States. For more, see NATO’S AFSOUTH Command. NATO’S Humanitarian 
Mission to Albania: AFOR, April-September 1999, Operation Allied Harbor at 
http://www.afsouth.nato.int/operations/harbour/default.htm#intro. (Accessed April 20, 2004). 
220 The U.S. European Command established Joint Task Force Shining Hope on April 4, 1999, to 
provide immediate humanitarian relief to ethnic Albanian refugees fleeing the Province of Kosovo into 
Albania and the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia. During its first 50 days of operation, JTF Shining 
Hope delivered more than 3,400 tons of food, equipment, and medical supplies to the refugees. On April 
25, JTF Shining Hope was assigned to NATOs Operation Allied Harbour. For more, see USAFE Press 
Release June 29, 1999 at http://www.usafe.af.mil/news/news99/uns99254.htm. 
221  NATO maintains about 2,000 troops (AFOR 2) in Albania for logistical support for the 
peacekeeping operation in Kosovo, KFOR. 
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up of seven European countries, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Romania, 
Turkey.222   The  United  States  in  partnership  with  the  SEDM  countries conducted in  
Albania from 2 April - 31 July 2001 the engineering exercise “Cornerstone 
2001.”223 This multinational exercise was conducted "in the spirit of" the Partnership for 
Peace program and represented the first in a series of engineering exercises planned for 
countries of the region. 
In the late 1990s the United States had started a program of supporting the 
aspirant NATO countries of Eastern Europe in assessing their military capabilities and 
reforming their armed forces toward achieving NATO compatibility. A series of defense 
assessments started in Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia. The same 
program was conducted in Albania during 2000-2001, supervised by the office of the 
U.S. assistant secretary of defense for internal security policy. In March 2000, a team 
from the ministry of defense led by Chief of the General Staff General Pellumb Qazimi 
traveled to Washington for a working visit to finalize with U.S. experts the program of 
reforming the Albanian armed forces. The defense assessment was the most detailed 
survey ever undertaken by the Albanian armed forces. It covered all aspects of the 
security and defense of Albania, including legal, structural, conceptual, doctrinal, 
operational and social framework. Based on the defense assessment, a ten-year program 
of reforming the Albanian armed forces was outlined. Minister of Defense of Albania 
Pandeli Majko was presented with the official document of the defense assessment at the 
Pentagon during a visit in the U.S. in late 2001. The United States pledged its full support 
to this program and a team of contractors224 was sent to Albania as early as 2002 to help 
in implementing it. This is the most far-reaching reform in the history of the Albanian 
                                                 
222  SEEBRIG has a mechanized infantry regiment, supported by an infantry company and a 
mechanized company, and four infantry mechanized battalions (their equipment consists mainly of light 
infantry weapons and armored transporters for personnel). The first location of the headquarters was in 
Bulgaria, at Plovdiv, and since July 2003 SEEBRIG headquarters is hosted at Constanta, Romania. 
223 The name "Cornerstone," referring to the first building block of a structure, set the scope and 
mission for the exercise, which was to build a two-mile national highway. The highway will allow for 
unimpeded travel from north to south. Training on task force/coalition organization and management was 
conducted in the execution of road repairs/construction to an Albanian national roadway in the vicinity of 
the Milot River Basin, North of the city of Lac, Albania. This joint multinational force completed the repair 
and construction of a 2.7 km road along the Mati River. 
224 SAIC, Science Application International Corporation 
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military and aims at creating a Western-oriented force, driven mostly by professionalism 
of active peacetime forces.225The process is well under way and it is foreseen that by late 
2006 Albanian armed forces will achieve interoperability with NATO, which will be a 
major step toward Albania’s membership in the Atlantic alliance.  
                                                 
225 This implies that military active peacetime units will be mainly based on professional forces, that 
is, officers, NCOs and professional soldiers, while only part of them will be manned by compulsory 
military service personnel. Active units will be manned over 90% with personnel and 100% with effective 
and operational equipment available at any time. Current active units manned at some 20-25% will become 
a reserve force, manned at cadre level. The development of professional peacetime forces in conformity 
with the project will result in a force with much greater operational capabilities than the present one, to 
protect the country’s interests and participate in international-led operations. For more see Defense 
Assessment of the Republic of Albania. Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security 
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III. THE WAR ON TERRORISM AND U.S.-ALBANIAN 
RELATIONS 
Even before September 11, Albania and the United States had established a close 
relationship on counterterrorism activities. As already noted, in the first years of the post- 
Cold War era, Albania had a relatively peaceful transition, compared with other countries 
of the region, but the security of the country has been tested, nevertheless, by new 
challenges and threats that had not been known in the past. In the period of transition 
from totalitarian regime to democracy, new phenomena, such as organized crime, illicit 
drugs, and human trafficking, as well as terrorism, were introduced. The Albanian 
authorities were not prepared to handle properly these new challenges, and, of course, 
they were not able to handle it alone. Not only did law enforcement agencies not have the 
required experience, but also existing legislation was inadequate to deal with such 
phenomena.  
A. ALBANIA AND THE ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST THREAT 
Even though reliable statistics on the religion are lacking, Albania is frequently 
referred to as a "Muslim" country.226 Although after September 11, some neighboring 
countries, for the obvious connotation, applied the reference, Albania as a nation does not 
affiliate herself with any particular religion, and Albanians are renowned for their 
extraordinary religious tolerance. (It is a little-known fact, for example, that Albanians 
protected their own Jews during the Holocaust while also offering shelter to other Jews 
who had escaped into Albania from Austria, Serbia and Greece.)227  
                                                 
226 Until the 16th century, almost all of Albania was Christian, the Roman Catholic religion being 
dominant in the north and the Orthodox religion in the south. In the 17th century, the Turks began a policy 
of Islamization by using, among other methods, economic incentives to convert the population. Albanians 
who adopted Islam received land, were exempted from taxes, and were allowed to serve in the military. By 
the 19th century, Islam became predominant in Albania, with about 65-70% of the population, while some 
20% remained Orthodox and 10-15% Roman Catholic. These groupings remained in effect until the 
communist government outlawed religion in1967, making it the world's only atheist state. Freedom of 
religion in Albania was restored only in 1990.  
227  According to Miles Lerman, former director of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in 
Washington, D.C., Albania was the only country in Europe which had a larger Jewish population at the end 
of the war than before it. For more, see Frosina Network: An Albanian Immigrant and Cultural Resource at 
http://www.frosina.org/articles/default.asp?id=89 
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Nevertheless, Albania is a plausible target for Islamic fundamentalism. After the 
collapse of communism, the emerging democracy created conditions for the revival of 
religion. But the chaotic, impoverished status of Albania in the early 1990s meant that it 
was easy for the country to be penetrated by Islamic extremists who wanted to impose 
hardcore religion in Albania. Many “humanitarian organizations” mushroomed 
throughout the country, promising they would help the economy, including agriculture, 
education, transportation, etc. In fact, the overwhelming majority of them didn’t invest in 
the economy; they invested instead in building numerous mosques and some religious 
schools known as madrasas.  In addition, in a move that brought much debate in the 
country, in 1993 Albania was invited to be a full member of the Organization of Islamic 
Conference (OIC). The government accepted the offer in the hope that money from the 
oil-rich Arab world would pour into the country. 228  The situation was already 
complicated after the democratic government in 1992, aiming at overcoming longtime 
isolation and bringing to the country much- needed foreign aid and economic assistance, 
introduced an “open-door policy”. Much-criticized loose procedures by which foreign 
nationals were able to obtain visas at the border permitted many unchecked persons to 
enter the country. Encouraged by inadequate border control and the negligent  
policy of the Albanian authorities, who kept focusing on political and economic reforms, 
in the early 1990s Albania gradually became a sanctuary for Al-Qaeda and other Islamic 
terrorist organization operatives.  
B. U.S.-ALBANIAN JOINT ANTI-TERRORISM OPERATIONS 
Although Albania has not been faced with any real terrorist threat directed against 
her citizens, the events of late 1990s have shown that international terrorist organizations 
not only have been able to penetrate Albania, but they also have developed bases of 
operation and targeted foreign installations in the country. It is believed that Albania's 
state of anarchy in 1997 gave Islamic Jihad and other groups the opportunity to enter the 
                                                 
228 In October 1992, a delegation from the Islamic Development Bank visited Tirana to lay the 
groundwork for Albania to join the bank. The delegation promised to invest in Albania and develop 




country freely and establish operatives’ cells. Some of these groups have been using 
involvement in charity as a cover for illegal activity.  
In mid-August 1998, a CIA statement acknowledged that an attack had reportedly 
been planned on the U.S. embassy in Tirana by the terrorist network of Osama bin Laden, 
who was already accused by Washington of planning the bombings of the U.S. embassies 
in Kenya and Tanzania earlier that month. Upon learning of the possible attack, the 
United States evacuated dependents and non-essential personnel from the embassy in 
Tirana and reinforced security around it. This was later followed by a series of visit 
cancellations by high-level U.S. officials to Tirana. On 11 June 1999, Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright avoided stopping in Tirana following her visit to Macedonia due to 
security concerns. State Department officials reasoned that there was a great deal of 
“lawlessness” in Albania, and that the Albanian government was not able to guarantee the 
security of high-ranking visitors.229 In July 1999, Secretary of Defense William Cohen 
cancelled at the last minute his official visit to Tirana for security reasons. The New York 
Times claimed that the secretary’s visit was cancelled because of “a threat on the ground 
related to Islamic militants affiliated to Osama bin Laden.”230 The closure of the U.S. 
embassy, as well as these visit cancellations, were followed by anxiety generated by the 
media and public opinion, and served as a wake-up call for Albanian authorities 
regarding the domestic security situation and the serious threat posed by terrorist cells 
operating in the country. The Albanian government started to work out a counter-
terrorism strategy and to enact suitable legislation. The United States assisted Albania in 
establishing and training counter-terrorism units, as well as in identifying and monitoring 
suspect organizations. 231  An intensive cooperation emerged between Albanian law 
enforcement agencies and U.S. counterparts. A FBI adviser was attached to the Ministry 
of Public Order of Albania, while CIA representatives and Albanian secret service SHIK 
(National Information Service) started fruitful counter-terrorism cooperation. During 
1998 counter-terrorism agents of the two countries executed a series of covert operations 
                                                 
229 CNN, 16 July 1999. 
230 The New York Times, 17 July 1999. 
231 Later developments indicated that some Arab charity organizations operating in Albania under a 
religion umbrella had links with terrorist organizations and had abused their funds for terrorist purposes. 
 66
to raid an Al-Qaeda forgery operation and another terrorist cell in Tirana. These joint 
actions by U.S. and Albanian intelligence authorities resulted in the arrests of about 10 
terrorist suspects, including several alleged to have been associated with bin Laden.232 
The 9/11 Commission: The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States acknowledged that “these operations may have disrupted a 
planned attack on the U.S. Embassy in Tirana, and did lead to the rendition of a number 
of Al-Qaeda-related terrorist operatives.”233  
Although much needs to be done, some steps taken before September 11 were 
significant in Albania’s attempt to fight terrorism within the country. Albania has been 
working to ratify all international instruments against terrorism.234 In addition, Albania 
has adopted an entire legislative initiative and is continuing its fight against illegal drug 
trafficking and organized crime that can support terrorist acts.  Albanian secret service 
SHIK (National Information Service), the Albanian Ministry of Public Order, and the 
Albanian Ministry of Defense created their specialized counter-terrorism units to deal 
with such phenomena.  
C. ALBANIA AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM 
Albania supported the U.S.-led international coalition’s fight against terrorism in 
its very early stages. Immediately after the terrorist attack on September 11, Prime 
Minister Ilir Meta of Albania stated that “[i]n the just fight of the civilized world against 
terrorism and criminal forces of the darkness, Albania stands with USA and our allies of 
the European Union by putting at their disposal not only its territory and military bases 
but also all the necessary infrastructure and human resources.” Furthermore, Albania 
gave full support to U.S. diplomatic efforts to build up an international coalition against 
terrorism. Speaking at the United Nations on the aftermath of September 11, the Albanian 
                                                 
232 In August, Albanian officials also confirmed that, over the previous two months, the CIA had 
helped them seize four suspected Islamic militants in Tirana, accused of links with Egypt's Islamic Jihad 
group, which claimed responsibility for the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981 and is 
believed to have ties with bin Laden. A few days before the embassy bombings, the International Islamic 
Front for Jihad threatened to take retaliatory action for the arrest of the four men, who had been extradited 
to Egypt. 
233 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States. Official Government Edition, p. 127. 
234 Albania has ratified all 12 UN international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism. 
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Ambassador to the U.N., Agim Nesho, noted that terrorism is a threat to international 
peace and security and should be fought with all the means, determination, and 
cooperation of all countries.235 In addition, Albania supported United Nations Security 
Council resolutions 1368 and 1373 that dealt with cutting off the financing of terrorist 
organizations, collecting and exchanging information for the prevention of terrorist 
attacks, and denying safe havens for terrorists.236 Albania was committed to pursuing the 
war on terrorism not only through supporting the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan, but 
also on the domestic front. During the month of December 2001, five foreign citizens 
were expelled from the country for threatening Albania’s security, and an additional 223 
foreigners were asked to leave for holding invalid residency permits. Suspecting illegal 
operations, the government froze the bank accounts and property of several Arab 
companies and NGOs, most of them engaged in religious activities. In mid-January 2002 
Prime Minister Meta told the Albanian Parliament that some of these companies were 
financially linked to the Al-Qaeda network.237 On the U.S. request, Albania granted 
overflight rights and opened seaports for refueling and maintenance support for the war 
against terrorism. Albania joined the International Coalition of Global War on Terrorism 
on January 10, 2002 in London, when a coalition memorandum was endorsed between 
the nations that were willing to participate in this coalition. Albania provided one elite 
commando detachment to Afghanistan under Turkish command to ISAF. In March 2003 
an Albanian liaison team was attached to the headquarters of the United States Central 
Command, USCENTCOM, and on July 20, 2004, Albanian armed forces filled two 
billets in CFC-A, one lieutenant colonel and one NCO.   
Albania made a humanitarian contribution to Afghanistan by donating military 
equipment in support of international efforts to build the new Afghan national army. The 
                                                 
235  The Permanent Representative of Albania to the United Nations, Ambassador Agim Nesho. 
Agenda 166: Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism: Report of the Secretary-General, New York, 
October 4, 2001. For full statement see http://www.un.org/terrorism/statements/albaniaE.html. (Accesses 
October 4, 2004.) 
236 Ibid. 




first donation was made on November 26, 2002. It consisted of small arms and 
ammunition, as well as mortars and shells, to equip one battalion of the Afghan national 
army. The second donation for the ANA, which consisted of ammunition and helmets, 
was delivered in April 2004. This move was encouraged by the United States and praised 
by the international community. 
Albania also strongly supported from the very beginning Operation Iraqi 
Freedom. The support was again in the realm of diplomacy, and by committing forces to 
the operation. On February 5, 2003, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the 
Security Council, presenting the U.S. case proving that Iraq had been developing illicit 
weapons. The Security Council did not reach a common stance on the subject, so the U.S. 
position did not gain approval. The following day, on February 6, 2003, a group of 
countries comprised of Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia signed a letter supporting a U.S. military 
intervention in Iraq. Known as the Vilnius letter, stated that the evidence presented by 
Powell proved to the UN Security Council that Iraq had clearly violated UN resolutions, 
and that the countries from the Vilnius group would support U.S. military intervention in 
Iraq.238 The Vilnius letter drew much criticism from some prominent members of the 
European Union, most notably France and Germany.239 French President Jacques Chirac 
launched a furious attack on signatories, saying they had behaved “recklessly” in making 
pro-American statements on the Iraq crisis. He accused them of “infantile” and 
“dangerous” behavior, noting that “they missed a good opportunity to keep quiet.”240 
The first contingent of one company of Albanian elite commandos was deployed 
in Iraq on June 06, 2003, as part of Multinational Brigade North (MNBN), with the 
mission to undertake and execute security operations in support of Operation “Iraqi 
                                                 
238 Vilnius 10 Sign Letter on Iraq. Europarliament. For more see 
www.europarl.eu.int/meetdocs/delegations/latv/20030271/18b.pdf 
239 Chirac Blasts EU Candidate. BBC. Acc Jan 28, 2004 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/Europe/2774139.stm 
240 Ian Black, Furious Chirac Hits Out at ‘Infantile’ Easterners. The Guardian. Feb 18, 2003. See 
www.guardian.co.uk/france/story/0,11882,897891,00.html. 
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Freedom.”241 Currently the Albanian company is deployed in Mosul, securing the Mosul 
Airport, patrolling in and out of the airport perimeter, and manning a rapid reaction force. 
In addition Albania participates in MNF-I and MNC-I staffs with one officer and one 
NCO. Albania is rotating her units in and out of theater and so far the Albanian military 
has had more than one battalion either already there or currently serving in Operation 
Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. The Albanian participation in Operation 
Iraqi Freedom has been fully backed by Albanian public opinion. Recent Gallup polls 
indicate that over 95 percent of Albanians support the United States’ actions in Iraq.242 
Not surprisingly, Albania was among the few, if not the only country where 
demonstrations didn’t take place on the eve of U.S. intervention in Iraq.243 
Albania opened up training areas for U.S. forces, to include the 173rd Airborne 
and the Marine amphibious groups, to conduct large-scale training exercises that were no 
longer possible in some NATO countries. When the U.S. yielded to protests by shutting 
down the training base on Vieques Island, Puerto Rico,244 Albania offered up Sazan 
Island for American units to do their final live-fire validation. After the recent PHIBLEX 
exercise conducted in Albania by 22nd Marines Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations 
Capable),MEU (SOC), the Unit representatives admitted that Albania provides an ideal 
place to train across all military capabilities from small unit live fire to naval surface 
fires.245 
September 11 served also for a reevaluation of domestic security and the 
measures taken to prevent any terrorist attack against Albania. In 2002 the government 
                                                 
241 Some of the main duties they have accomplished include; Convoy Escort, Checkpoints, Patrolling 
in the city, Guard Duty and Support the new Iraqi Police to maintain public order. 
242 See footnote 1. 
243 While the war on Iraq was becoming closer and more real, a great number of protests against the 
war were organized around the world by peace-promoting, anti-globalization, anarchistic and other 
organizations. Millions of people came out in the streets to protest against another war waged by the U.S. 
These protests took place in a lot of countries all over the world, including the United States and Great 
Britain. 
244 http://web.amnesty.org/report2004/pri-summary-eng 
245  Keith A. Milks, 22d MEU (SOC) wraps up Albanian PHIBLEX Marines, March 13, 2004 
http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf/lookupstoryref/200431393059 (Accessed September 12, 
2004.)  
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approved the National Action Plan against terrorism, which specifies the relevant 
responsibilities of all government agencies in the war against terrorism and requires that 
every government agency make appropriate legal arrangements to better cope with the 
terrorist threat. According to the State Department report on the trend of global terrorism 
released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counter-terrorism on April 29, 2004, 
“Albania continues to cooperate extremely closely with the United States and other 
governments in sharing information and investigating terrorist-related groups and 
activities.”246 The report acknowledged that the Albanian government has frozen the 
assets of a notorious terrorist financier, curtailed the activities of suspect Islamic NGOs, 
and detained or expelled individuals suspected of having links to terrorism or attempting 
to foment religious intolerance. In June 2003, the Albanian Parliament passed a strong 
money-laundering law that included antiterrorist financing provisions, bringing Albania’s 
legislation into compliance with international standards. The report gives credit also to 
the Bank of Albania, which has established a task force to monitor all financial activities 
of secondary banks and their compliance with client verification.247 
2003 was one of the most successful years in cooperation between the two 
countries. Albania and the United States signed and ratified a number of agreements, 
including a treaty on the Prevention of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and 
the Promotion of Defense and Military Relations. Secretary of State Colin Powell visited 
Tirana on May 9, 2003, to sign an agreement with the foreign ministers of Albania, 
Croatia, and Macedonia aimed at promoting the entry of these three countries into 
NATO. The agreement, the “U.S.-Adriatic Partnership Charter,” was proposed by the 
Albanian, Croatian, and Macedonian presidents to President Bush at the NATO Prague 
summit in November 2002 and was jointly drafted by the three countries.248  
                                                 
246 http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/31626.htm 
247 Ibid. 
248  The document commits these countries, which were left out of the next wave of NATO 
enlargement, to individually and cooperatively achieve political and economic reforms that will facilitate 
their integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. Recognizing that they are on a path to alliance membership, 
the Charter also provides for bilateral meetings at least twice a year between each of the countries and the 
United States, which will assist in the achievement of the reforms, in order to review progress toward 
meeting the objectives outlined in the document. 
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Powell also signed an agreement with the Albanian government that exempts 
Americans in the country from possible war crimes prosecution by the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, placing Albania, an EU aspirant, at odds with the 
EU members, which are among the 139 signatories to the ICC’s founding treaty.249  
Meanwhile the exchange of high-level defense officials between the two countries 
reached another stage. In January 2003, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General 
Richard Myers invited Albanian Chief of the General Staff General Pellumb Qazimi for 
an official visit to Washington. While the Albanian chief of defense forces has visited the 
United States on more than one occasion since 1993, this was the first official visit of an 
Albanian top military official to the United States. General Myers praised the Albanian 
contribution to the war on terrorism, while General Qazimi thanked the United States for 
the assistance given to Albania in reforming the military and the support given to 
Albania’s efforts toward NATO membership.250  
In April 2003 bilateral defense consultations were held in Washington to discuss 
future cooperation between the United States and Albania regarding defense and security. 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld met at the Pentagon with Albanian Minister of 
Defense Pandeli Majko. The Albanian minister used the opportunity to reiterate 
Albania’s willingness to host permanent U.S. bases on her territory. Although this offer 
has been repeated by Albanian authorities on many occasions in the last decade, the 
timing now seems opportune, since it is known that Western European countries, 
especially Germany, have placed growing restrictions on the training of U.S. forces 
stationed on their territory, and therefore the United States is seeking other military bases. 
As the New York Times notes,   
[t]he Pentagon has proposed a plan to withdraw its two Army divisions 
from Germany and undertake an array of other changes in its European-
based forces, in the most significant rearrangement of the American 
military around the world since the beginning of the cold war…the aim is 
                                                 
249  Albania was the 2nd European country to conclude a bilateral agreement with Washington 
protecting U.S. citizens; particularly those taking part in peacekeeping activities, from extradition to the 
court on grounds that they could be exposed to politically motivated prosecution. Romania, an EU 
candidate, is the only other European nation that has signed such an agreement with the United States. 
250 Korrieri, January 9, 2002. 
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to afford maximum flexibility in sending forces to the Middle East, 
Central Asia and other potential battlegrounds… Proponents [of the plan] 
see little merit in keeping a large number of forces in Germany now that 
the cold war is over. They argue that the United States would be better off 
withdrawing most of them and establishing new bases in Southeastern 
Europe, from which forces could be rushed if there was a crisis in the 
Caucasus or the Middle East.251  
Two months later, on June 10, 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld visited Tirana and 
discussed with Albanian officials the war on terrorism and Tirana’s desire to become a 
full-fledged member of NATO. Rumsfeld expressed U.S. appreciation for Albania's 
contributions to the war against terror by noting, “We particularly appreciate and value 
the assistance in Afghanistan as well as in Iraq…Albania also stepped forward and signed 
the Vilnius 10 letter, which came at a time that was important. We recognize that and 
appreciate it as well." 252 
In late March 2004, Prime Minister Fatos Nano traveled to Washington to 
participate in the official ceremony of admitting seven new members to NATO.253 
During his conversation at the White House with President George W. Bush, the prime 
minister pledged continuous Albanian support for the war on terrorism and expressed 
Albanian readiness to increase the number of Albanian troops in Iraq. The Albanian 
position carried another significance of the high priority that Albania places on its 
relations with the United States, since it came at a time when Spain had withdrawn its 
forces from Iraq, following the terrorist attack on Madrid.  
In all contacts with U.S. counterparts, Albanian authorities have been insistent in 
their demand for more U.S. involvement in bringing U.S. capital to Albania. Albanians 
view U.S. investment in the country as a security certificate for more foreign investment, 
which is crucial to the economic development of the country. On the other hand, as 
proved during the Kosovo operation, building appropriate infrastructure compatible with 
                                                 
251 Michael R. Gordon: “A Pentagon Plan Would Cut Back G.I.'s in Germany”, The New York Times, 
June 4, 2004 
252 Jim Garamone, Rumsfeld Discusses NATO Membership With Albanians, American Forces Press 
Service, June 11, 2002. 
253 Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. 
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operations by U.S. and other NATO forces when needed remains particularly important 
for the war on terrorism. Some encouraging steps have been taken in this regard. In 2002 
the U.S. company Lockheed Martin was awarded a $33-million contract to provide new 
surveillance radar, navigation and landing aids, communications equipment, and an 
automated system for Albania’s air traffic management.254  The final goal will be to 
modernize Albania’s air traffic management system completely by 2007. The first phase 
of the project focused at Tirana’s Rinas Airport -- now called “Mother Theresa Airport,” 
after the Albanian Catholic nun who dedicated her life to humanitarian care - has already 
been completed. 
                                                 
254 The work commenced in January 2003 with the goal of improving safety, security, service and 
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IV. TOWARD THE FUTURE: CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The fall of communism presented Albania, as it did many other countries of 
Eastern Europe, with the challenge of completely redefining her relationship with the 
Western community, as well as with an opportunity to finally overcome its long self-
imposed isolation from the rest of Europe. Albania adopted a strategic reorientation and 
during the last decade her foreign policy has been focused on integration of the country 
into Euro-Atlantic structures based on three main paradigms: a strong relationship with 
the United States; an interdependent relationship with the European Union; and a 
moderate regional policy approach.  
For historical and cultural reasons Albania remains one of the most pro-United 
States countries in the world. Recent international polls indicate that pro-United States 
sentiment is getting even stronger within Albanian public opinion, particularly after the 
U.S.-led Kosovo campaign. The close cooperation of Albania with the United States has 
fully served Albanian national interests, and, in the last twelve years, every government 
in Albania has defined its policy toward the United States based on its national interest 
and the widespread positive feeling of the Albanian people toward the United States. 
Although in dire economic need, Albania is trying to prove to the United States and the 
international community that she can play a constructive role in regional security affairs 
and help on the global war on terrorism.  
The United States, on the other hand, remains interested in the stability of 
Southeastern European countries and has continuously supported the independence of 
Albania. Since the collapse of communism, the United States has provided substantial 
assistance for Albania’s political and economic transformation. Between 1991 and 2003, 
the United States has provided to Albania $358.62 million through the Support for East 
European Democracy (SEED) Act. The United States supports Albanian integration into 
Euro-Atlantic structures and is providing meaningful assistance for reforming the 
Albanian military through a ten-year program of cooperation.  
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The U.S.-led NATO operation in Kosovo and the current U.S.-led global war on 
terrorism gave Albania not only the opportunity to express her gratitude to the Western 
community but also to show her commitment to Western values. As a matter of fact, 
Albania remains a good example of how some small and rather poor countries can still 
play an important role in supporting the United States despite their inability to project 
power beyond their borders. As is already known, September 11 has changed the way 
countries’ capabilities are viewed by the United States. After September 11, the Bush 
administration has made clear that it puts greater emphasis upon coalitions than upon 
alliances. In fact, the Western alliances, with NATO at their core, contain the most 
professional military forces in the world; those forces will be central to achieving victory 
in the war on terrorism. But the recent debate over Iraq between members of Western 
alliances underlined the need for a flexible approach toward countries’ capabilities and 
coalitions in the war on terrorism. The United States National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism(NSCT) recognizes the importance of international cooperation, which becomes 
imperative in a world where terrorist organizations pay no respect to traditional 
boundaries. There is no doubt that the answer to international terrorism cannot come 
without America, but it cannot come from America exclusively. Today’s growing threat 
of terrorism demands international consensus and understanding not only from powerful 
countries but from small countries, too. As a matter of fact, global understanding of the 
problem of terrorism is far from realization because too many different national interests 
stand in the way of global consensus. Different countries do have different views on the 
problem of terrorism, and their responses to the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism vary.  
As stated in the NSCT, some countries are committed to fighting terrorism but 
lack the capacity to fulfill their sovereign responsibilities. After September 11, the United 
States redoubled its efforts to develop programs that help these countries to acquire the 
necessary capabilities to fight terrorism through a variety of means.255 The cooperation of 
Albania with the United States in the war on terrorism represents another good example 
of why the NSCT calls for the United States to assist states that “are committed to 
fighting terrorism but lack the capacity.” Not only has this Southeastern European 
                                                 
255 U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003, p.20 
 77
country been willing to help the United States in any way possible after September 11, 
but Albania is also currently participating with combat units in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Albania’s willingness and commitment to fighting terrorism may prove in the future to be 
more important for implementation of this principle of the NSCT than her ability to 
project power beyond her borders. It is expected, therefore, that the United States will 
continue to help Albania enhance her national capacity. So, the question is not just how 
Albania can help; it is rather what the United States should do to enable Albania to 
become a serious and useful partner in the long-term campaign against international 
terrorism.  
A. CAN ALBANIA REALLY HELP?  POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
Despite its daunting problems at home, Albania has wholeheartedly supported the 
United States in the global war on terrorism and is trying to successfully engage itself as 
a useful partner to the United States by exchanging security information, freezing 
terrorist assets, shutting down suspect Islamic NGOs, expelling foreign Islamic 
extremists from the country, and providing military and diplomatic support for the U.S.-
led actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Albania not only publicly backed the U.S. 
intervention -- a move that put it at odds with many Western European members of the 
European Union, but also sent a combat unit to Iraq. Although Albania is a small and 
rather poor country by U.S. standards, its security partnership with the United States has 
been excellent in the last decade and reached a zenith during the crisis of Kosovo. The 
Kosovo crisis underscored Albania’s utility as a staging area for U.S. operations in the 
Balkans. Albania allowed the United States to use its territory and air space for the 
Kosovo operation and has done the same for the current campaign against terrorism. 
Also, Albania allowed U.S. aerial unmanned vehicles to be stationed in its territory 
during crises in Bosnia, a decision that even some NATO allies couldn’t make.  
At a time when the United States is increasingly focused on security outside of 
Europe, the Albanian geographic location can not only serve as a useful staging area for 
U.S.-NATO-related exercises but also can assist in projecting American military 
capabilities and security leadership to nearby crisis zones. As is known, over the past 
decade Western European countries, especially Germany, have placed growing 
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restrictions on the training of U.S. forces stationed on their territory. The United States is 
seeking other locations for the U.S. military to be stationed for better coping with the 
international terrorist threat.  Albania has expressed its willingness to host American 
military bases in its territory if so asked by the United States and can play an important 
role as one of America's strongest Balkan allies and partners. 
As in the past, relations with the United States will continue to represent a major 
external reference in Albanian political contests and will remain crucial not only in 
domestic political decisions but also in shaping the international agenda of Albanian 
political institutions. But an important issue that cannot be ignored is how Albania 
balances any tensions between her close relationship with the United States, on the one 
hand, and her bid for European Union membership, on the other. As is true of many other 
countries of Eastern Europe, Albania has wholeheartedly aspired to become a member of 
European Union. The EU membership fully serves Albania’s national interests. 
Politically, EU membership fulfills the hope that the successful model of the European 
Union, with its values of democracy, the rule of law, the protection of human rights and 
minorities can be transferred to Albania, thus ensuring lasting peace, freedom, security 
and political stability in the country. Enlargement will finally end her artificial distance 
from Europe, and thus her citizens will enjoy much-desired free movement within the 
enlarged European Union.  
Economically, Albanian integration into the European Union is seen as a vehicle 
toward prosperity. EU membership gives Albania the opportunity to share in projects of 
economic integration in which the free movement of capital to and from Albania will 
apply. Currently, the European Union is by far the most important source of capital and 
the main trading partner for Albania. Over seventy-five per cent of Albanian trade is with 
European Union countries.256  Since 1992, Albania has received a total of 1.3 billion € 
from the European Union’s assistance programs.257  
                                                 
256 Italy (71.5% exports, 34.6% imports), Greece12.7% exports, 21.7% imports, and Germany 5.5% 
exports, 5.6% imports).  
257 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/albania/#5.Acessed August 30, 2004 
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Therefore, Albania will need to develop reliable, interdependent relations with 
both the European Union and the United States, and avoid the emotional practice of 
taking sides when the United States and the European Union disagree with each other on 
various political issues. Counterpoising the European Union and the United States is not 
only a mistake but it is also irrational and counterproductive, particularly for a small 
country like Albania. Despite its excellent relations with the United States, no serious 
political actor in Albania would think about ignoring the European Union when searching 
for solutions to regional and international security problems. The recent debate over Iraq 
between prominent members of the European Union and the United States underlines just 
how difficult it will be for a small country like Albania to make rational political 
decisions. Therefore, this process will involve hard political bargaining for Albania and 
sometimes extremely difficult choices.  The nightmare of any serious policy maker in 
Albania is to be caught between the two pressure fronts of the United States and the 
European Union.  The case of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is the best example 
of an issue on which Albania increasingly felt the pressure of being stuck in the middle. 
While the United States strongly pushed for bilateral agreement with Albania to exempt 
U.S. soldiers from the ICC, the European Union pressured Albania to hold to the Union’s 
line of supporting the Court. It is possible that time and again Albanian political 
institutions will be put in the very difficult position of making choices between the 
European Union and the United States of America.  
Albanians are keen on showing their support for the anti-terrorist coalition led by 
the United States and to demonstrate to the international community that Albania is a 
reliable partner in stability operations, as well as in terms of control of flows of 
information, people and money. Albanians know that a reliable partnership in the fight 
against terrorism will be a valuable element when the USA assesses Albanian candidature 
for NATO membership. Nevertheless, Albanians must be realistic and realize that a 
pragmatic and sophisticated American policy takes into account both the scope and the 
limits of the possibilities offered by a tiny country like theirs. At the same time they 
should understand that as much as the United States can help, it is for Albanians to create 
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their national policies and to take full responsibility for them. The United States will not 
make the policies of Albania, it merely will respond to them.  
Albania’s moderate regional policy and the contribution in Afghanistan and Iraq 
have been appreciated, but in the future Albania will need to prove to the United States 
and Western allies that she is able to maintain domestic stability and progress with 
political and economic reforms.  
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATION FOR THE UNITED STATES 
Albania is pivotal to the security of the region due to its strategic location and to 
the fact that large Albanian communities are living throughout the Balkans. Thus helping 
Albania enhance internal stability and facilitate its political and economic integration is in 
the U.S. national interest. A stable, prosperous Albania would be in a good position to 
help U.S. efforts to promote peace in the region and to combat terrorism, arms 
proliferation, and international organized crime. 
Indeed, following September 11, the United States began to engage these 
countries in the fight against terrorism. In return for the Albanian contribution to the war 
on terrorism, the United States provides Albania with political support, economic 
assistance, and military aid. The United States provides Albania with specialized training 
and assistance to help build its capacities to combat terrorism. Some of these programs 
are military in nature, but many focus on improving the efforts of civilian authority. They 
range from seminars in drafting legislation to the provision of equipment for enhancing 
border security and customs capability.  
Since September 11, the United States has also worked with Albania to improve 
cooperation on law enforcement activities against terrorists. The close working 
relationship between U.S. law enforcement experts and their Albanian counterparts has 
focused on exchanging security information, freezing the assets of terrorists and affiliated 
persons and organizations, and preventing terrorist transit and safe haven in the country. 
In addition, the United States is helping Albania to reform its military through a ten-year 
program of bilateral cooperation that will bring Albanian armed forces close to NATO 
standards. This is the most far-reaching reform in the history of the Albanian military. 
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The results over the last three years are promising for the future of the Albanian armed 
forces and for achieving Albania’s national goal of becoming a NATO member. 
For many years to come, Albania will remain far from being seen as a main 
investment destination for United States capital, but the economic reforms could offer the 
legal bases and the necessary stability for an increased number of U.S. investments. 
Recent approaches of large U.S. companies to Albania, such as Lockheed Martin and 
Exim Bank, present a significant step in this regard; Albanian officials hope these 
companies will encourage further international commercial investment in the country. 
Albanian membership to NATO will further increase the security zone in Southeastern 
Europe. It will also provide commercial interests with the necessary security guarantees 
for U.S. and Western capital to be invested in Albania. Albanians hope that the 2007 
NATO summit presents to them a great opportunity, and strong U.S. support for the 
Albanian bid for NATO membership remains crucial. 
Albania remains by far the most pro-American country in Southeastern Europe, 
but there is another factor that makes Albania a special case in comparison to other 
countries of the region. Although Albania does not affiliate herself with any particular 
religion, from an outside perspective Albania is perceived as a Muslim country. 
Therefore Albania is important to the United States symbolically since it is important for 
the United States to demonstrate that it has strong support from predominantly Muslim 
countries in the global war on terrorism. 
In conclusion, small and poor countries like Albania may prove in the future to be 
more important to the United States through their contribution to the war on terrorism 
than through their military capabilities. While Albania will surely need the United States 
for a number of strategic reasons, including security assistance, support for future NATO 
membership, and the encouragement of investment and economic development in the 
country, the United States will also benefit from assisting Albania and keeping her as an 
ally in its struggle against international terrorism. Albania shares many of the U.S. 
interests in the region; is becoming an important ally of the United States in the Balkans 
and can assist in projecting American military capabilities and security leadership to 
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